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1.0 Executive Summary 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This executive summary is divided into 2 sections.  Section 1.1 sets out the motivation 
and scope of the study.  Section 1.2 discusses the key findings and main conclusions. 
 
1.1.1 Motivation for this study 
 
The primary aim of the proposed research is to investigate and analyse changes in 
recent years in the market for the provision of non-audit services (NAS) with a particular 
focus on the joint provision of audit and non-audit services and the potential effects on 
independence and the quality of audit.  To reflect the need for a better understanding of 
the importance of non-audit services provision, and in order to further quantify, qualify 
and categorize these, we investigate how NAS are perceived by the public and investors, 
and why companies request joint provision from firms.   
 
Against a background in which issues of audit competition, efficiency, pricing and value 
added are on the front stage of the audit debate and audit regulation, this research is 
designed to provide input relevant to these issues, input which will inform and be of use 
to firms, as well as the professional bodies and regulators more widely. Such an 
investigation provides additional insights on the magnitude and type of NAS provision to 
a broad spectrum of companies and stakeholders and also develops an understanding of 
how NAS may enhance and/or overlap with their use of audit services. 
 
1.1.2 The scope of this study 
 
The study focuses on the extensive body of literature directed toward significant aspects 
of non-audit service provision and issues associate, therewith against a background of 
the dramatic market and regulatory changes ahead of and shortly after the arrival of the 
new millennium and the continued pace of development in the markets for financial 
reporting (including reporting beyond the financial statements) and auditing.  
 
We consider it to be directly relevant to the ongoing debate at both national and 
European level as to issues of competition, liability and regulation in the audit market.  
This paper seeks to: contextualise the issue; provide a resume of the arguments that 
have been advanced for and against allowing such joint provision; and concludes with a 
brief review of possible policy options.  It seeks to do this by means of: 
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a) Consideration of the change in the extent and range of non-audit service 
provision by accounting and auditing firms since the beginning of the previous 
decade; 
b) Exploration of the manner in which the perception and practice of audit has 
changed in recent years away from that of monitoring the accuracy of company 
financial reporting to that of an enabling and facilitating function within the overall 
risk and business management of the client, and the more recent change away 
from the business risk approach; 
c) Discussion of arguments for and against continuing to allow the provision of non-
audit services to audit clients with a particular focus on the interaction with the 
change in the audit approach and the generation of two way knowledge 
spillovers between audit and non-audit services,  
d) A review of the current policy debate in the UK and at EU level on continuing to 
allow the joint provision of non-audit and audit services to audit clients, and as a 
business model for large firms. 
e) Conclusions and consideration of policy issues. 
 
1.1.3 Audit quality and joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
 
We review the relevant academic literature on impacts on audit quality from joint 
provision, with a particular focus on covering the past 10 years to provide an update to 
more recent research and provide a reflection on the changes that have impacted on the 
provision of audit and non-audit services.  We also reflect on relevant non-academic 
literature, such as official reports (e.g. EC papers, FRC publications) where this 
contributes to an understanding of the current debate or where this shapes the 
environment in which audit and NAS operate. 
 
1.2 Key findings and conclusions 
 
The research under review provides a somewhat mixed picture on the effects of the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services on auditor independence and the quality of 
audit.  At first glance, the evidence would not appear to overwhelmingly support a blanket 
ban of joint provision.  However, we note that the research and arguments supporting 
limits to the provision of non-audit services to an audit client are somewhat more 
substantial in comparison to arguments that support joint provision. 
On the whole, the reviewed evidence tends to support arguments against the provision of 
non-audit services to an audit client.  A diminished emphasis on joint provision also 
appears to be reflected in recent market trends, expressions of concerns by regulators, 
policy makers and various stakeholders, and regulatory responses to perceived 
shortcomings of audit with regard to its social and economic function. 
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The provision of consulting services has become an increasingly important source of 
revenue for the Big Four over the past decade, but there has at the same time been a 
significant and steady decline in the provision of non-audit services to audit clients. Data 
on joint provision by the Big Four may reflect a significant decline in the perceived 
importance or credibility of arguments that favour joint provision, as well as raised client 
concerns with regard to perceptions of impairment to auditor independence from the 
provision of non-audit services to audit clients.  This supports conclusions drawn from the 
review of the relevant literature and policy responses which suggests that arguments for 
not providing non-audit services to audit clients are more convincing. 
Further conclusions can be based on considerations with regard to the impact of 
behavioural and cognitive factors on auditor judgement and auditor independence, and 
their effects on the ability of auditors to conduct audit with the required degree of 
scepticism.  The impact of cognitive bias on the quality of auditor judgement and 
decision-making supports the conclusion that not to provide non-audit services is a good 
thing.  Regulators and policy makers would increasingly appear to share such an 
interpretation. 
For reasons discussed in the text we welcome the trend reflected in market data, whilst 
acknowledging the possibility for specific circumstances where it could be useful for some 
services other than audit to be provided to an audit client.  Market pressures may already 
have led to a decline of joint provision, although some rationale would suggest moderate 
provision of selected non-audit services to audit clients to provide limited benefits.  The 
latter proviso might make it difficult to support a blanket prohibition of the provision of 
non-audit services to audit clients without further research which seeks to more clearly 
ascertain the threat to independence from specific non-audit services. 
In sum, while a complete ban on audit firms carrying out non-audit work for clients whose 
accounts they audit may neither be justified nor advisable, we note that a combination of 
market trends and regulatory concerns have led to a decline in joint provision, a trend 
which we would like to support. 
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2.0 Introduction 
 
 
The primary objective of this report is to provide a detailed review of the extensive 
academic and other literature which has investigated and analysed the manner in which 
accounting and audit firms have provided non-audit services to audit clients and others, 
and to provide insights which may be of value to policy makers and others. Issues of 
auditor independence and the public perception of auditor independence in connection 
with the provision of non-audit services (NAS) to their audit clients were recently again 
highlighted by corporate failures related to the financial and economic crisis of 2008-09 
and by perceptions that a substantial threat to auditor independence – and a 
consequential reduction in confidence that can be placed on an audit opinion – exists 
where non-audit services are provided by the auditor. Perceptions exacerbated where 
there is a high ratio of NAS fees to audit fees paid to a company’s auditor, the scale of 
the issue finding reflection in proposals by the Treasury Select Committee in October 
2009 (and related proposals by the European Commission in 2011 – see COM(2011) 
779), to impose a blanket prohibition on the provision of non-audit services by auditors 
recommendations which for the time being, were not supported in the UK which 
essentially continued to rely on a threats and safeguards approach, clarification with 
regard to definitions, and specific prohibitions in respect of non-audit services included in 
ethical standards (see, ES 1, ES 5, revised, APB, 2011).
2
 
 
The majority of existing research effort has focused on specific issues, for example is the 
provision of non-audit services associated with more earnings management? or with a 
diminished propensity to modify the audit report? But there has also been more limited 
investigation of wider and more holistic issues – for example analysis of changes in this 
market consequent to the divesting by the large firms of their ‘big ticket’ consultancy arms 
around the turn of the millennium; the spotlight shone on the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services with regards to Enron and other high profile North American cases; 
the reaction embodied within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) in the US and the various 
UK government inspired post Enron reports; the new requirements for disclosure and for 
monitoring and approval of the provision of non-audit services by the incumbent firm; the 
entry into the audit and consulting market of firms primarily focused on consulting rather 
than on the provision of audit services; and the significant increase in the extent and 
                                                 
2
 On 28 September 2012, the FRC announced limited changes to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code and the Stewardship Code.  Changes to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code include tendering by FTSE 350 companies of external audit contract at 
least every ten years, applied on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. See: 
http://www.frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2012/September/FRC-
publishes-updates-to-UK-Corporate-Governance-C.aspx. 
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detail of reporting beyond that required by statute, reporting which is frequently 
accompanied by forms of assurance provided by firms.  
 
The present review aims to focus on the literature relating to the joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services and the potential effects on independence and the quality of audit.  
In the last three decades there has been an array of literature, largely North American in 
orientation, on issues related to the provision of non-audit services, a literature that 
includes inter alia: Palmrose (1986), Firth (1997), Canning and Gwilliam (1999),  Defond 
et al. (2002), Ezzamel et al. (2002), Firth (2002), Frankel et al. (2002), Beattie and 
Fearnley (2002), (who provide an extensive and valuable review of the then extant 
literature as to the relationship between the provision of a broad range of non-audit 
services and auditor independence), Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Ferguson et al. (2004), 
Kinney et al. (2004), Krishnan et al. (2005), Hay et al. (2006), Srinidhi and Gul (2007), 
Basioudis et al. (2008), Davis and Hollie (2008), Pott et al. (2009), Dedman et al. (2009), 
Beattie et al. (2009), Francis (2011), Krishnan et al. (2011). 
 
In their detailed review of the literature on auditor independence and non-audit services, 
Beattie and Fearnley (2002) note that while there is little clear support for the view that 
joint provision impairs independence in fact, there is a reasonable consensus that joint 
provision adversely affects perceptions of auditor independence.  Schneider et al. (2006) 
reach a broadly similar conclusion in their review of the literature.  In a more recent 
review of the post-Enron changes to the NAS regulation in the UK, EU and US, Beattie et 
al. (2009) note the significant drop in the percentage of NAS fees to audit clients from 
1997 to 2008, attributing the drop to both regulatory changes, but also to a voluntary 
choice by companies as a result of reputational concerns of accepting NAS from their 
external auditor.  Beattie and Fearnley (2009) further examine the impact of regulatory 
changes on decisions on NAS provision and acceptance, and note that audit committees 
are more reluctant to procure services from their auditor due to concerns about auditor 
independence, in combination with the need for auditors to comply with ES 5 (APB, 
2011), which restricts their ability to provide many services, and a perceived heightened 
deterrence from a strengthened UK audit inspection regime with regard to breaches of 
ethical standards or inaccurate reporting of the breakdown of NAS. 
 
Through systematic analysis and review of this literature this report aims to both make 
this literature more accessible to a wider audience – but also offer critical insights into a 
number of current regulatory issues confronting the auditing profession in the UK both 
directly in terms of whether there should be further restrictions on the provision of non-
audit services to audit clients and indirectly as to the wider policy debate on concentration 
in the auditing industry. 
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3.0 Context and Background 
 
Accounting and audit firms, and in particular the large international firms have 
transformed in the last 40 years from organizations, relatively modest in size with a 
primary focus on audit and the provision of services closely associated with audit, to 
multi-national organisations providing a range of services categorized loosely under the 
umbrella of knowledge services.  Over the same time, there has been a perceived 
transformation in the role of the audit firm from that of a periodic external check on the 
accuracy of a company’s financial statement toward a value adding function integrated 
within and contributing to the company’s overall risk management profile and business 
performance.  Since the 1970s, auditors have relied on the audit risk model to gain an 
understanding of the different components of audit risk.  Comprised of inherent risk, 
control risk, and detection risk, audit risk refers to the possibility of the auditor issuing an 
inappropriate opinion on materially misstated financial statements. The 1990s saw a shift 
to the business risk approach, which involved a greater focus on an understanding of the 
business risks that could find reflection in the financial statements, with less attention to 
detailed procedures. A shift back to the audit risk approach might be witnessed after the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals of 2001-02. 
 
Accounting firms in both the United Kingdom and the United States have always provided 
services other than audit both to their audit clients and others. In the earliest years as 
accounting practices developed audit work was of relatively minor importance within the 
range of professional services offered, and it was not until the late nineteenth century that 
audit came to be seen as the primary fee earner for accounting firms.
3
  After 1900 
although firms continued to offer a range of services to both audit and non-audit clients, 
the development of the professional audit, and the introduction of the statutory 
requirement for all limited companies to be audited, led to the audit function taking over 
as the mainspring of activity for the larger firms and this situation continued for much of 
the twentieth century. 
 
In the United States the Second World War saw an extension of the range of services 
offered by accounting firms and it was there that consulting per se, as opposed to 
traditional non-audit services linked more closely to the financial statements as such, 
                                                 
3
 Fee schedules for Whinney, Smith and Whinney (a forerunner of what is now Ernst & 
Young) show that in 1870 insolvency work amounted to more than 90% of total income 
and it was not until 1900 that auditing services generated more than 50% of the firm’s 
income (Jones, 1981). 
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began to develop.
4
 The AICPA’s first committee on management services was formed in 
1953, and in 1969 the AICPA adopted a resolution stating: 
‘It is an objective of the Institute, recognizing that management services 
are a proper function of CPAs to encourage all CPAs to perform the 
entire range of management services consistent with their professional 
competence, ethical standards and responsibility.’
5
  
 
Accounting firms in the United Kingdom were perhaps slower to move away from their 
traditional audit base (although accounting and taxation services were important 
constituents of fee income for a number of firms large and small
6
). Nevertheless as the 
large firms in particular transformed themselves into multi-national multi-service providers 
the growth in the range and extent of non-audit services and their importance in terms of 
fee income grew dramatically.  
 
By the early 1990s only one of the then Big Six firms derived less than one half of its total 
United Kingdom fee income from services other than audit, and by the end of the decade 
non-audit services far outweighed audit in terms of fees for each of the then Big Five. 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the greater proportion of these services were 
being provided to audit clients with only 30% of the income accounting firms derived from 
their FTSE 350 clients being generated by statutory audit.
7
 Similar developments took 
place in the United States. By the year 2000 audit accounted for just 30% of the 
revenues of the largest accounting firms – down from 70% in 1977. Consulting and other 
management advisory services represented half of fee income – up from 12% in 1977 
(Levitt, 2000).  
 
This dramatic growth in non-audit service provision, and in particular provision to audit 
clients, has heightened concerns as to the threat posed to auditor independence. In the 
United States Arthur Levitt, a former SEC Chairman, noted earlier that: 
‘As firms expand their product lines, consulting and other services may 
shorten the distance between the auditor and management. 
Independence – if not in fact, then certainly in appearance – becomes a 
more elusive proposition.’
8
 
 
These concerns are not in themselves new. In the United States the Cohen Commission, 
which was set up in the aftermath of a series of accounting and audit failures in the early 
                                                 
4
 Although Pitt and Birenbaum (1997, p.17) note a wider range of consulting activity 
including what would now be considered to be management advisory services going back 
to before World War One in the United States. 
5
 Previts (1985) at p.94. 
6
 For example in the Lloyd’s insurance market it was commonplace before the reforms of 
the 1980s for auditors to provide both accounting and audit services to managing agents 
and syndicates. 
7
 Accountancy, October 2000, p.10. 
8
 Levitt (2000). 
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1970s, was one of the first quasi-independent bodies to formally consider the issues 
involved.
9
 In 1978 the SEC required disclosure of the percentage of fees for non-audit 
fees relative to audit fees and disclosure across category where provision exceeded 3% 
of the audit fee together with disclosure of whether the board of directors or its audit 
committee had approved the non-audit services. However, these disclosure requirements 
were withdrawn in 1982, and it was not until 2000 that the SEC introduced the present 
requirements for disclosure of fees for audit services and non-audit services split by 
category between Financial Information Systems Design and Implementation and Other.  
 
In the United Kingdom in 1986 a DTI consultative document on the implementation of the 
Eighth Directive of the then European Community invited comments on the possibility of 
legislating to prohibit auditors from providing non-audit services to audit clients. No such 
legislation was introduced although the 1989 Companies Act enabled the introduction of 
the present requirement for disclosure of the aggregate amounts paid to auditors for non-
audit services by means of statutory instrument in 1991.
10
  The Companies Act of 2006 
empowers the Secretary of the State to issue regulations that require companies to 
disclose the compensation paid to their auditors.  With The Companies (Disclosure of 
Auditor Remuneration and Liability Limitation Agreements) Regulations 2008 [Statutory 
Instrument (SI), 2008] as amended by SI, 2011,
11
 all but small and medium sized 
companies are required to disclose in the notes to their audited financial statements the 
amount receivable by their auditor for the audit and all other services provided to the 
company.
12
 
 
                                                 
9
 The Commission (which although set up under the auspices of the AICPA considered 
itself to be independent of that body) found that no prohibition of non-audit services was 
warranted. Indeed the Commission recommended that professional standards should 
require that public accounting firms establish policies and procedures to assure that 
knowledge gained from other services is made available to the partner in charge of the 
audit so that the partner can consider its implication for the audit function (Cohen 
Commission, 1978). 
10
 Buijink et al. (1996) note that in Europe similar disclosure requirements exist in Ireland, 
Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Italy.  
11 Regulations requiring disclosure of auditors’ remuneration were originally made by the 
Secretary of State in accordance with powers conferred by CA 1985, s.390B, as 
amended by the Companies Act 2004.  These regulations (The Companies (Disclosure of 
Auditor Remuneration) Regulations 2005 (SI, 2005)), came into force on 1 October 2005.  
CA 1985, s.390B (as amended) was incorporated in CA 2006, s.494, followed by The 
Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration and Liability Limitation Agreements) 
Regulations 2008 (SI, 2008).  These came into force on 6 April 2008.  Amending SI, 
2008, The Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration and Liability Limitation 
Agreements) (Amendment) Regulations 2011 (SI, 2011) came into force on 1 October 
2011.  Schedule 2A was substituted in place of Schedule 2 (updating the services, and 
associated remuneration, provided to audit clients by auditors which are required to be 
disclosed). 
12
  Each type of service is specified in Schedule 2A to the 2011 Regulations (see footnote 
11). 
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From 2004 the task of ensuring that audits by appointed company auditors are ‘carried 
out properly and with integrity and a proper degree of independence’ is delegated to the 
Financial Reporting Council and subordinated independent bodies of this regulator.
13
 The 
ICAEW Code of Ethics (ICAEW, 2011), the largest such body, contains a number of 
provisions designed to prevent the offering of non-audit services to clients compromising 
independence. Audit and other recurring income from any one client is restricted to 15% 
of gross practice income (10% in the case of listed and other public interest clients).
14
 In 
the provision of non-audit services care must be taken not to perform management 
functions or to make management decisions. For listed and other public interest clients 
an auditor should not participate in the preparation of the company’s accounts and 
accounting records and reference is made to the need to take care when engaging in 
recruitment activity on behalf of a client. There are few outright prohibitions in the Code 
but there is a ban on a firm auditing any financial statements which ‘include the product of 
a specialist valuation carried out by it or an associated practice or organisation’ and some 
rather more technical restrictions with regard to the provision of corporate finance advice 
where the firm acts as auditor or advisor to two or more parties involved in a takeover 
subject to the City Code.  In addition to the provisions of the Code there are Auditing 
Standards requirements that the audit committee considers the scale and nature of non-
audit services provided to the company by its auditor.
15
 
 
In the United States the actual regulation of non-audit service provision to audit clients 
has not been substantively different from that in the United Kingdom although there have 
been structural differences, for example the creation of the Independence Standards 
Board in 1996 (the Board was wound up in 2001), and the more specific regulatory 
interest of the SEC. For many years there were slightly more stringent SEC restrictions in 
terms of the provision of services by accounting firms that were members of the SEC 
practice division including the proscription of relatively marginal services such as 
psychological testing, executive recruiting, public opinion polls, merger and acquisition 
services for a finder’s fee and actuarial services. Although under the chairmanship of 
Arthur Levitt, the SEC proposed significantly greater proscription, the revised rules 
ultimately approved in November 2000 went primarily down the route of disclosure and 
audit committee approval with extension of prohibition only with regard to certain IT 
                                                 
13
 The FRC’s function include the oversight and regulation of auditing and external 
financial reporting; setting, monitoring and enforcing accounting and auditing standards; 
establishing ethical standards in relation to the independence, objectivity and integrity of 
external auditors; operating an independent investigation and discipline scheme for 
matters which raise, or appear to raise, important issues affecting the public interest; 
overseeing the regulatory activities of the accountancy profession (FRC, 2006, pp.2, 11, 
14). 
14
 See Buijink et al. (1996) for details of income restrictions across EU countries (pp. 76-
77). 
15
 See Statement of Auditing Standards, SAS 610 ‘Communication of audit matters to 
those charged with governance’, (APB, 2001). 
14 
 
consultancy services, the provision of legal services and, for clients with assets in excess 
of $200m, provision of more than 40% of internal audit.
 16,17 
 
 
Despite arguments by accounting practitioners which emphasise the absence of conflict 
of interests from the joint provision of audit and nonaudit services, others have 
maintained that the increased economic dependence between auditor and client impacts 
negatively on an auditor’s ability to remain objective.  The substantial growth in the 
provision of non-audit services to audit clients fuelled concerns by regulators and others 
over the impact on audit quality, and particularly on the incentives by auditors to constrain 
opportunistic or outright fraudulent accounting practices.  As stated by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) 2000 (9): 
‘Under any circumstances, it can be difficult for an auditor to make a 
judgment that works against the audit client's interest. Where that 
judgment may imperil a range of service engagements of the firm, of 
which the audit is a fairly small part, it may be unrealistic to expect that 
an auditor can ignore completely what the firm stands to lose by the 
auditor's action.’   
 
Such concerns have motivated a number of studies examining the relation between NAS 
purchase and financial reporting quality. DeFond et al. (2002) infer auditor independence 
from audit opinions, while other studies in this research stream focus on the association 
between NAS purchase and earnings management activity, as proxied by estimated 
discretionary accruals using U.S. and UK data, with mixed results (e.g. Antle et al., 2006; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Frankel et al., 2002; Gore et al., 2001; 
Larcker and Richardson, 2004).  Ferguson et al. (2004) propose that higher levels of 
economic bonding between auditor and client resulting from the joint provision of NAS 
may reduce auditors' willingness to restrain clients' opportunistic accounting practices 
and, in turn, may reduce the quality of financial reporting.   
 
Gordon (2002) refers to the phenomenon of low visibility sanctions when discussing 
shortcomings of the gatekeeper function of auditors.  Low visibility sanctions include the 
non-renewal of a (non audit) contract, or not getting a consulting contract in the first place 
(neither action has to be publicized in proxy statements by the client firm). This is 
contrasted with highly visible events, such as firing the auditor, a material event that must 
be disclosed, and in the UK is subject to both parties’ notification of the appropriate audit 
                                                 
16
 ‘After careful consideration of the arguments on all sides, and for the reasons 
discussed below, we have determined not to adopt a total ban on non-audit services, 
despite the recommendations of some, and instead to identify certain non-audit services 
that, if provided to an audit client, render the auditor not independent of that client.’ (SEC, 
2000). 
17
 Details of the rules are available on www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7919.htm 
15 
 
authority.
18
   Even if this were not subject to disclosure, it would likely result in a 
considerable amount of public scrutiny and inquiry.  The potential harm from such 
increased public scrutiny on the company can be larger than the potential harm to an 
auditor’s reputation (in fact, this may even enhance the latter’s reputation).  Similar 
damage to the company could arise from the voluntary resignation of the auditor.  Hence, 
a company’s senior management might be less likely to press for such a visible event.  
Instead, it may be more likely that management makes use of a variety of low visibility 
sanctions.  The use of this type of sanctions is made possible when the accountant 
(likewise, a member of the board) is receiving other forms of compensation from the 
firm.
19
  More subtle pressures can be exerted on the gatekeeper the more involved he or 
she is in the company.  Disciplinary measures that are not subject to disclosure increase 
the credibility of threats against a gatekeeper who disagrees with management on a 
particular issue.  Auditor impartiality may be severely compromised where an accountant 
submits to the loss of independence by agreeing to a clients’ accounting interpretation.  
The fear is that this may lead to a race to the bottom (Gordon, 2002) where accounting 
firms see a competitive advantage in setting the bar of professional credibility and 
independence ever lower.   
 
Arthur Andersen was described as having fallen into this trap when the firm changed over 
the years from being a group of independent auditors with a high ethical standing, to a 
profit centre unit.
20
  In a reflection on causes for the failure of auditors to act as 
gatekeepers in the US, Coffee (2001), highlights the diminished legal threat due to 
changes in the legal liability of auditors in the United States, and notes a perceived 
implicit collusion where the auditor: 
 
                                                 
18
 For the UK, see sections 522 to 525 of the Companies Act 2006, and recent guidance 
by ICAEW available at:  http://www.icaew.com/~/media/Files/Technical/Audit-and-
assurance/audit/auditor-cessation-statements.pdf.  FRC guidance available at:  
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Conduct/Professional-oversight/Oversight-of-
Audit/Notification-of-change-of-auditor.aspx. 
19
 Gordon (2002) in particular points to the bundling of auditing plus tax planning, due to 
what he perceives as the carryover mindset from tax planning into accounting planning.  
Tax planning can be a highly valued service: Enron paid virtually no corporate taxes in 
the five years prior to its demise, despite reporting nearly $2bn in earnings from 1996 
through 2000. 
20
 An evolution from a partnership of accounting professionals, constrained by a strong 
sense of professional ethics, to a profit-maximizing limited partnership organization using 
high-powered incentive compensation schemes is seen as one of the factors in the 
profession’s morphing from ‘watchdogs to lapdogs’.  (Quote from US Congressional 
hearings on the role of Arthur Andersen in the failure of Enron Corp).  For a discussion of 
the effect of changes to the legal and organizational setup of accounting firms, see 
Macey and Sale (2003).  For a shorter account of the cultural change in the accounting 
profession, see Jeanne Dugan “Did You Hear the One About the Accountant? It’s Not 
Very Funny”, Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2002, p. A1. 
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‘...may be able to market itself less as a faithful and diligent watchdog for 
the shareholders than as an accommodating and flexible friend of 
management.’ (p.12) 
 
Coffee (2001) emphasises the potential for economic coercion that accompanies the 
provision of NAS to an audit client:   
‘Corporate managers may find means by which they can seduce 
gatekeepers into acquiescence, such as by linking material amounts of 
other business to the auditing engagement, which business can be 
withdrawn if the auditor fails to acquiesce in the client’s aggressive 
accounting policies. The more developed and material the business 
relationships between the client and the gatekeeper, the less the likely 
independence of the latter. This diagnosis leads to an obvious reform: 
restrict the ability of auditing firms to offer non-audit services to their 
clients.’  (p.13) 
 
Such concerns are in line with a recent reflection on the 2010 APB’s consultation on the 
provision of non-audit services by auditors (APB, 2010a) which argued that audit quality 
is compromised in both fact and perception when the auditor carries out any non-audit 
service (p.11): 
‘The sale of other services creates fee dependency and forces auditors 
to align their interests with those of the audit clients.’ 
 
The passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 effectively put into law existing SEC 
prohibitions and extended them to include a complete ban on the provision of internal 
audit and a number of other management advisory services. However, other services, 
which specifically include taxation services, can continue to be provided to an audit client 
if they are pre-approved by the client’s audit committee. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in part to reduce the economic dependence of 
auditors on individual audit clients resulting from the provision of non-audit services. 
Beattie et al. (2009) suggest that the post-Enron changes to the non-audit services 
regulatory regime in the UK have been effective to some degree, citing active 
engagement of the audit committee in the purchase of non-audit services from incumbent 
auditors, statutory requirement for the disclosure of services purchased from incumbent 
auditors detailed by types of service, detailed threats and safeguards framework in the 
form of Ethical Standard 5 issued by the Auditing Practices Board, and inspections of 
listed company audits by the Professional Oversight Board’s Audit Inspection Unit.  Using 
a questionnaire addressed at finance directors, audit committee chairs and audit 
partners, these authors find a change in the purchasing behaviour of UK listed company. 
The enhanced role of the audit committee has inspired a cautious approach by board 
directors, resulting in reluctance when approving the purchase of non-audit services from 
incumbent auditors. The directors are careful to ensure that they do not attract adverse 
publicity from the disclosure of an inappropriate level of non-audit service fees to the 
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incumbent auditor. Ethical Standard 5 restricts auditors from providing a wide range of 
services to their audit clients. In addition, the presence of the Audit Inspection Unit has 
deterred attempts of breaching ethical standards or inaccurate reporting of non-audit 
service purchase.  The post-Enron prohibitions on the provision of certain NAS led to 
large reductions in the amount of NAS provided to audit clients. In the UK, ES 5 issued 
by the APB (APB, 2011) addresses independence issues associated with the joint 
provision of NAS which may have contributed to the observed decline of NAS provision to 
audit clients.   
 
In their 2009 review, Beattie et al. summarize findings which show that NAS provision to 
audit clients dropped from a peak of over 300% of audit fees in 2001 to 75% in 2008, 
attributing the drop to both regulatory changes and voluntary choices made by 
companies.  However, auditors were perceived to have less knowledge and 
understanding of client business as a result of reduced NAS provision to audit clients.  A 
US study conducted by Pandit and Rubenfield (2011) reveals that although non-audit 
fees from audit clients have declined, more than 78% of the sample companies saw 
some increase in total auditor remuneration from the year 2002 through the year 2007. 
More than half of the sample paid at least 50% more in total auditor remuneration while 
more than 35% of the sample at least doubled their total auditor remuneration in the year 
2007 compared to that in the year 2002.  Whilst it would appear that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act has been effective in curbing the purchase of non-audit services from auditors 
through the outright prohibition of provision of a number of non-audit services to audit 
clients, it had at best a limited impact on decreasing the economic bonds between auditor 
and client, and thus does not significantly address threats to independence that arise as 
a result of economic dependence. 
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4.0 Overview of Recent Literature  
 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of recent research, debate and 
policy responses (proposed or implemented) on the joint provision of audit and NAS to 
audit client, in reflection of changes to the regulatory and economic context that has 
taken place since the global shift to re-regulation in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) (2002), and related regulatory responses in the UK and elsewhere, since the 
Enron and WordCom scandals.  Key post-SOX changes in the UK financial reporting and 
auditing regime include the allocation of responsibilities for setting auditing and ethical 
standards, and the conduct of independent inspections of public interest audits to the 
FRC, changes to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), which require closer 
engagement between auditor and client’s audit committee. The adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the EU in 2005 adds a more rules-based nuance 
to financial reporting than that represented by UK GAAP.  The debate on financial 
regulation and in particular the quality of audit and the contribution of audit to corporate 
governance was further encouraged by the global banking and financial crisis of 2008/09.   
 
Francis (2011) notes that there are multiple drivers of audit quality, which may explain the 
at times contradictory results that can be derived from a review of the literature. The 
following section summarizes recent research findings, prior to a subsequent discussion 
of key arguments, classifying these into four categories as set out below: 
 
 Research suggesting that non-audit services affect perceived independence  
 Research suggesting that non-audit services do not affect perceived 
independence 
 Research suggesting that non-audit services affects actual independence 
 Research suggesting that non-audit services do not affect actual independence 
 
4.1 Research suggesting that non-audit services affect perceived independence  
 
The overall conclusion from the literature review of Beattie and Fearnley (2002) and 
Schneider et al. (2006) is that, although there is little evidence indicating that joint 
provision will affect actual independence, there is a fair amount of evidence suggesting 
that joint provision will affect perceived independence. 
 
Given that sociological research indicates cultural differences between English speaking 
and Nordic countries, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) examined the impact of 
non audit services on perceived auditor independence in Denmark using questionnaires. 
They found that shareholders, bank loan officers and journalists perceive lower auditor 
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independence in the presence of NAS provision. It was also ascertained that the type of 
NAS has a differing effect on the degree of independence impairment and the provision 
of MAS by a separate department of the audit firm does not improve independence in 
appearance. 
 
In their examination of abnormal market returns for Andersen clients in the US around the 
indictment announcement, Krishnamurthy et al. (2006) found that the negative share 
price reaction was more acute when more non-audit services was provided by Andersen. 
This shows that the market perceives that auditor independence is at risk when the 
incumbent auditor also provides non-audit services. 
 
In an Australian study, Gul et al. (2006) found a negative relationship between non-audit 
services provided by an incumbent auditor and the value relevance of earnings (using 
earnings response coefficient as the proxy). This relationship is weaker for firms that 
employ the then Big Six auditors. This shows that investors perceive the joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services to impair auditor independence but this adverse perception 
is somewhat mitigated by the appointment of a major audit firm. It is argued that, for 
major audit firms, the litigation and reputation cost will outweigh the benefits of client-
specific quasi-rent. 
 
Utilising a questionnaire design, Alleyne et al. (2006) investigated the perceptions of 66 
auditors and 148 users in Barbados on the issue of auditor independence. They 
observed that economic dependence on audit client, provision of non-audit services, high 
competition, small firm size, being a sole practitioner, lengthy tenure, and the size and 
closeness of the Barbadian society had a negative impact on the perception of auditor 
independence. 
 
Using an event study approach and by examining market model prediction errors around 
relevant dates, Liu and Nabar (2006) investigated the manner stock prices of Ernst & 
Young’s (E&Y’s) US audit clients reacted to the sale of the accounting firm’s consulting 
arm to Cap Gemini. They found that the audit clients’ abnormal stock returns were 
positively related to two events: the approval of the sale by E&Y’s partners and the 
approval of the transaction by Cap Gemini’s stockholders. These findings indicate that 
the provision of non-audit services by incumbent auditors do affect investors’ perception 
of auditor independence.  
 
Using a behavioural research methodology, Colbert et al. (2008) conducted an 
experiment to examine the reactions of US lending officers to the disclosure of financial 
information system design and implementation service (FISDIS) fees, and tax service 
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fees. They found that tax service fees, but not FISDIS fees, affect the lenders’ perception 
of auditor independence. 
 
Kumar et al. (2008) conducted a survey to measure the perception of government linked 
companies’ shareholders in Malaysia towards the impact of non-audit service provision 
by incumbent auditors on independence. They found that the shareholders regard 
management services as the non-audit service having the most adverse impact on 
independence. This is followed by human resource services and advisory services. 
 
German investors perceive that the provision of most types of non-audit services will 
impair auditor independence. However, perceived auditor independence is higher if the 
non-audit service is delivered by a separate department of the audit firm. The type of 
non-audit service has an impact on the degree of impairment in perceived independence 
(Quick & Warming-Rasmussen, 2009). 
 
In a US study, Lai and Krishnan (2009) found that the market value of a firm is higher if 
financial information system-related services is purchased from incumbent auditors 
compared to firms that do not. This shows that despite the negative perception of non-
audit services on auditor independence, the provision of financial information system-
related services is seen as a value-adding activity providing a net benefit. 
 
A recent UK questionnaire study revealed that private investors and institutional 
shareholders perceive economic dependence and non-audit services as more serious 
threats to auditor independence than long tenure (Dart, 2011). 
 
Using a survey questionnaire, Al-Ajmi and Saudagaran (2011) examined the perceptions 
of auditors, bank-loan officers, and financial analysts in Bahrain on the issue of auditor 
independence. They found that economic reliance on audit clients, provision of non-audit 
services, competition, and tenure of audit service are considered the most serious threats 
to auditor independence. 
 
Using a sample of UK listed companies, Holland and Lane (2012) studied the impairment 
of independence in appearance by analysing the relationship between levels of total 
relative fees (ratio of the combined audit and non-audit fees due to the company’s auditor 
expressed as a proportion of the audit firm’s UK income) and market value. They adopted 
a non-linear model and found that perceived independence is only impaired at high total 
relative fee levels. There is a positive association between total relative fees and market 
value at lower levels. This provides support for the adoption of a threshold concept rather 
than the prohibition of the supply of non-audit services by incumbent auditors. 
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4.2 Research suggesting that non-audit services do not affect perceived 
independence 
 
Using market-based measure of disclosure quality and stock market liquidity, Ascioglu et 
al. (2005) examined the impact of audit and non-audit fees on auditor independence. 
Based on a large sample of S&P 1500 stocks, they found little evidence to support the 
argument that auditor remuneration adversely affects the auditor-client relationship. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the undesirable effects of auditor 
remuneration on market liquidity are prevalent in firms with weak corporate governance 
structures. 
 
Iyer and Reckers (2007) conducted a behavioural experiment involving 47 audit seniors 
from a Big Four accounting firm to examine the interactive effect of non-audit service 
provision and auditors’ perception of management integrity on assessments of risk of 
material misstatement. Although they found that non-audit service did not affect risk 
assessment, they ascertained that the risk of material misstatement arising out of suspect 
management integrity was significantly associated to whether the auditor provided 
material amounts of non-audit services. This demonstrates that while non-audit service 
provision may not in itself affect auditor independence, it has the ability to affect audit 
quality by moderating the effect of other audit evidence. 
 
In a US study, Ghosh et al. (2009) found no association between perceived auditor 
independence, where earnings response coefficients were used as proxies, and non-
audit service provision. 
 
In an Australian study, Bugeja (2011) found no association between perceived auditor 
independence, where non-audit services provision were used as proxies, and takeover 
premiums. This indicates that the provision of non-audit services is not seen to impact 
audit quality. 
 
4.3 Research suggesting that non-audit services affect actual independence 
 
Using a sample of non-financial companies listed on the International Stock Exchange, 
Firth (2002) found that high consultancy fees is associated with unqualified audit reports. 
Although this finding provides support for the impaired independence argument, it can 
also be interpreted as the incurrence of consultancy fees to iron out uncertainties and 
disagreements prior to the audit, thus justifying the issue of a clean audit report. 
 
In a US study, Larcker and Richardson (2004) found a positive relationship between the 
ratio of non-audit fees to total fees and the absolute value of accruals. However, using 
latent class mixture models, they discovered that the positive association only applies to 
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approximately 8.5% of the sample. Also, a negative relationship was prevalent between 
total auditors’ remuneration and accruals. The latent class analysis reveals that this 
negative relationship is strongest for audit clients with weak governance. The overall 
results indicate that auditors’ behaviour is constrained by reputation risk. 
 
Using UK and US data, Antle et al. (2006) modelled the joint determination of audit fees, 
non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals in a system of simultaneous equations. They 
found that non-audit fees have a statistically significant negative effect on abnormal 
accruals in the UK. This indicates that non-audit service provision raises the quality of 
financial reporting. However, there is evidence that audit fees increase abnormal accruals 
in both the UK and US. This is coherent with behavioural theories of unconscious 
influence or bias in the auditor-client relationship.   
 
In a study of Taiwanese firms, Chin et al. (2007) found that earnings forecasts reviewed 
by the incumbent auditors tend to be more optimistically biased and inaccurate when the 
ratio of non-audit services is high. This finding supports the hypothesis that the provision 
of non-audit services impairs auditor independence. As in this case, where the rules of 
review-level assurance for management earnings forecasts are less stringent, the 
manifestation of independence impairment is more likely given the lower liability risk. 
 
In a US study, Hoitash et al. (2007) examined the relationship between audit quality, 
using accrual estimation error metric and performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as 
proxies, and abnormal total auditor fees. They found a negative relationship between 
audit quality and abnormal total fees, indicating the adverse effects of economic bonding. 
 
Nagy (2008) conducted a US study and found that it is less likely for an audit firm to issue 
a material weakness internal control report if the audit firm also provides the financial 
information design and implementation service. This provides support over concerns of 
non-audit service provision.  
 
Using a sample of listed companies in New Zealand, Cahan et al. (2008) did not find an 
association between non-audit service fee growth rate or length of time of the non-audit 
service relationship and discretionary accruals. However, discretionary accruals are 
positively related to the interaction of time-period measures of non-audit service 
relationships and client importance. This shows that independence may be compromised 
when a strong economic bond develops through the continuous delivery of non-audit 
services over a period of time to significant audit clients. 
 
Using UK data, Basioudis et al. (2008) find that there is a lower likelihood for financially 
distressed companies with high non-audit fees to be issued a going-concern modified 
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audit report.  Evidence supports the contention that high non-audit fees have a 
detrimental effect on going-concern reporting judgments for financially stressed U.K. 
companies. This might indicate an impairment of auditor independence as a result of joint 
provision. 
 
Using data from Taiwan, Duh et al. (2009) examined the relationship between non-audit 
services and audit adjustments in the period before and after the Procomp scandal. They 
found a significant and negative relation between non-audit services and audit 
adjustments in 2003 (prior to the Procomp scandal) but no such association existed in 
2004 (after the scandal). This demonstrates the trade-off consideration of gaining non-
audit fees and avoiding litigation and reputation loss. These findings indicate that the 
proscription of non-audit services may not be the only way to uphold audit quality. 
 
In a US study, Lim and Tan (2010) found that the positive relationship between audit 
tenure and audit quality is stronger if the audit work is carried out by specialists and when 
economic dependence is lower. As the provision of non-audit services will increase the 
economic dependence of auditors on a particular audit client, the finding suggests that 
non-audit service provision will impair audit quality. 
 
Krishnan et al. (2011) examined the relationship between earnings management and 
non-audit services pre and post-SOX in the US. They discovered that the decline in 
income-decreasing earnings management was greater for companies with larger 
decreases in non-audit services. This indicates that the joint provision of audit and non-
audit services do have an adverse impact on actual auditor independence. However, the 
lack of such evidence for income-increasing earnings management indicates that the 
regulatory and economic framework was effective to a certain extent during the pre-SOX 
period. 
 
Using meta-analysis procedures, Habib (2012) statistically aggregated results across 45 
studies, correcting for statistical artefacts like sampling and measurement error. He found 
that the level of client-specific non-audit fees results in lower financial reporting quality. A 
decomposition of the financial reporting quality proxies reveal that earnings management 
is positively related to non-audit fees while the propensity to issue a qualified opinion is 
negatively associated with non-audit service provision, indicating that non-audit services 
impair independence in fact. The negative relationship between earnings-response 
coefficients and non-audit fees indicate that perceived independence is jeopardised. 
However, the underlying studies used for this analysis are not homogenous. 
 
Using US data Basioudis et al. (2012) link NAS with tenure and going concern reporting 
as a proxy for audit quality.  Examining whether high non-audit fees and auditor tenure 
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jointly affect auditors’ propensity to issue going concern (GC) modified audit opinions, 
after controlling for auditor tenure, the authors find that the relationship between non-
audit fees and auditors’ propensity to issue GC modified audit opinions is negative, but 
that this relationship only holds for auditors with long tenure (longer than or equal to four 
years). Such a relationship was found for Big 4 as well as, smaller, industry specialized 
auditors.  This would indicate that auditors’ unwillingness to report client going concern 
problems as a result of long tenure and high non-audit fees poses threats to auditor’s 
independence. 
 
4.4 Research suggesting that non-audit services do not affect actual independence 
 
In a US study, DeFond et al. (2002) found that auditor independence, surrogated by 
auditors’ tendency to issue going concern audit opinions, is not affected by the provision 
of non-audit services by incumbent auditors. 
 
In a US study, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) challenged the findings of Frankel et al. (2002) by 
adjusting discretionary current accruals for firm performance. As a result, they found no 
systematic evidence supporting the claim that the provision of non-audit services by 
incumbent auditor affects auditor independence. 
 
In a US study, Kinney Jr. et al. (2004) did not find a statistically significant relationship 
between fees for financial information systems design and implementation services or 
internal audit services and restatements. This shows that the quality of financial reporting 
is not affected by the purchase of these services from incumbent auditors. However, the 
finding may be partly due to small sample sizes for registrants purchasing these services. 
Another finding from the study is that there is a positive association between unspecified 
non-audit service fees and restatements, indicating an impairment of auditor 
independence. On the other hand, tax service fees is found to be negatively associated 
with restatements, indicating that financial reporting quality benefits more than 
compensate for the negative effects of economic dependence.  
 
In a US experimental study, Asare et al. (2005) found that the acceptance of an audit 
client was not affected by the potential of non-audit service provision. This implies that 
non-audit service provision may not be the cause of loss in auditor independence. 
 
Using expert reports provided in Australian takeovers, Bugeja (2005) studied whether the 
independence on a non-audit service (provision of expert reports) will be impaired if 
rendered by the target firm’s auditor. Although this is somewhat the reverse of the typical 
study, whether non-audit service provision impairs the independence of auditors, the 
nature of the issue under scrutiny (whether independence will be impaired in the 
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presence of economic bond) remains unchanged. The results indicate that expert 
opinions are significantly related to the target firm’s directors’ recommendations 
regardless whether the expert provides other services to the target firm. However, capital 
market reaction is significantly lower if the report is provided by the target firm’s auditor. 
This indicates that although actual independence remains intact, the market perceives 
that the expert report is of lower quality. 
 
In a New Zealand study, Hay et al. (2006) found no relationship between the nature of 
audit opinion nor the tenure of auditor, and non-audit fees. The evidence does not 
indicate that independence of mind is impaired by the provision of non-audit services. 
 
Lim and Tan (2008) analysed the relationship between audit quality, proxied by the 
propensity to issue going-concern opinion, magnitude of discretionary current accruals, 
propensity to meet or miss analysts’ forecasts, as well as the market’s reaction to 
earnings surprises, and non-audit services in the US. No relationship was found between 
non-audit services and the propensity to issue going-concern opinion, magnitude of 
discretionary current accruals, and propensity to meet analysts’ forecasts (coded as the 
tendency for actual earnings minus analysts’ forecasts to be within zero to positive one 
cent). However, the propensity to miss analysts’ forecasts (coded as the tendency for 
actual earnings minus analysts’ forecasts to be within negative two cents) is negatively 
associated with the provision of non-audit services. Non-audit service fee is also 
associated with a lower earnings-response coefficient (ERC), implying that investors 
perceive non-audit services to impair earnings quality. An important finding from the 
study is that audit quality (using propensity to issue going-concern opinion, propensity to 
miss analysts’ forecasts and ERC as proxies) increases with the scale of non-audit 
services when acquired from specialist auditors as opposed to non-specialist auditors.    
 
In a US study, Bloomfield and Shackman (2008) found little evidence that non-audit fees 
is positively associated with earnings restatement. However, total auditor’s fee is 
positively related to earnings restatement. They also found that audit firm industry 
specialisation is negatively associated with restatements while a positive relation is 
prevalent between restatements and the then Big 5 audit firms. 
 
Using New Zealand data, Zhang and Emanuel (2008) found no evidence of a negative 
relationship between non-audit service provision and earnings conservatism. This 
provides support that actual independence is not affected. 
 
Fuentes and Pucheta-Martinez (2009) conducted a Spanish study and found that the 
joint provision of audit and non-audit services do not reduce the likelihood of the issuance 
of qualified audit reports. 
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In a US study, Vînătoru and Calotă (2009) did not find an association between non-audit 
fees and restatements. However, total auditor’s remuneration is significantly related to 
restatements. The study also revealed that there is a negative relationship between audit 
firm industry specialisation and restatements, and that a positive association exists 
between the then Big 5 audit firms and restatements. 
 
Ianniello (2012) examined the relationship between audit opinions and non-audit services 
in Italian listed companies and did not find a statistically significant association. However, 
this result needs to be interpreted with caution as there were only 10 qualified audit 
opinions in the sample. Other findings include a positive association between unqualified 
audit report with an emphasis of matter paragraph and non-audit services. Although this 
implies that there is an impairment of auditor independence, it is worthwhile bearing in 
mind that these cases may not warrant a more severe opinion. 
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5.0 Changes to the Provision of Non-Audit 
Services 
 
 
During the past decade there have been significant structural changes as certain of the 
very large firms have sought to dispose of all or part of their consulting businesses. 
Andersen Consulting (now Accenture) divorced itself from Arthur Andersen in August 
2000 after a long-running and acrimonious dispute. Ernst & Young spun off its consulting 
business to the Paris based consulting and information technology group Cap Gemini in 
the same year, and KPMG floated KPMG Consulting in February 2001.   
 
In October 2002, PwC sold its management consulting and technology services arm to 
IBM Global Business Services for approximately $3.9 billion in cash and stock.  However, 
substantial areas of non-audit activity, for example taxation services, remain in the large 
firms, and the question arises as to the extent to which it is the intention of these firms to 
build up their consulting activities anew.   
 
Recent data provides an insight to the increasing revenue importance of consulting 
activities and changes in the distribution of NAS provision between audit and non-audit 
clients since the formal disposal of their consulting subsidiaries.  Based on figures 
released by the Professional Oversight Board (2012), in the six years to 2011, the Big 
Four have experienced a steady increase in the proportion of fee income from non-audit 
work for non-audit clients, with the fee income from non-audit clients representing 63% of 
total fee income in 2011 (see Figure 1).   
 
In contrast, Big Four fee income from non-audit work to audit clients has been declining 
in importance. The percentage of non-audit fee income derived from audit clients (as a 
proportion of total income) by the Big Four has decreased year-on-year from 19% in 2006 
to 14% in 2011. The decrease was attributed to higher audit committee involvement and 
tighter ethical standards. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Professional Oversight Board, 2012 
 
Although these figures might appear to indicate that the pressures on auditor 
independence from the joint provision of audit services and NAS may be diminishing, 
they are not sufficient to retire continuing concerns about auditor independence. The 
substantial continued provision of non-audit services to audit clients means that threats to 
auditor independence, whether perceived or actual, cannot be discounted.  The summary 
evidence which reflects a diminished relative importance of NAS provision to audit clients 
is also far from conclusive since individual audit clients may still be purchasing 
substantial amounts of non-audit services from their auditor. Given the significant 
increase in the importance to firms of the provision of NAS, it would also not be an 
inconceivable suggestion that the prospects of lucrative fees from non-audit clients might 
influence the level of conflict a firm is willing to pursue during an audit, and thus gain a 
reputation as being a difficult or even disloyal business partner. 
 
Key findings from a recent consultation by the APB (APB, 2010a) on NAS provision to 
listed companies reflect the increasing importance to accounting firms of providing these 
services: 
 
 The 2008 average ratio of non-audit to audit fees for listed companies was 76%.      
 In 2008, 300 of the 1,740 listed UK companies had ratios of non-audit to audit 
fees that are equal to or exceed 1:1.  Two thirds of these companies had a ratio 
of 2:1 or less, and only a few had ratios above 5:1.    
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 Those 300 listed companies with ratios in excess of 1:1 in 2008 accounted for 
about 49% of the total value of non-audit services fees reported by the 1,740 
listed companies.  
 In 2008, FTSE 100 companies accounted for about 70% of the total of all non-
audit services fees (and 66% of the audit fees) reported by the 1,740 listed 
companies.   
 
In relation to FTSE 100 companies the APB found that the fees for non-audit services 
provided by the auditors between 2002 and 2009 reduced in absolute terms by 30%, and 
reduced as a percentage of audit fees from 191% to 61%.  The trends identified by the 
APB in the level of non-audit services fees to individual audited entities are broadly 
consistent with the overall pattern shown by total audit and non-audit services fees 
earned by audit firms from entities that they audit over the same period by the 
Professional Oversight Board (POB, 2012), as reflected in Figure 1. 
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6.0 Regulatory Concerns 
 
Until about a decade ago, criticism has largely been internalized and regulatory concern 
muted.  This has changed dramatically in consequence of events in the United States 
where a seemingly unending saga of revelations of corporate financial engineering and 
accounting machinations, the Enron and WorldCom scandals among them, has led to 
accounting and auditing firms being given a degree of prominence in the form of public 
debate previously unheard of.  This aroused the interest of law makers and regulators, 
most notably in the United States with the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but also in 
the United Kingdom and in the EU.  This criticism has focused on the failure of auditors to 
control, identify, and report on accounting manipulation, manipulation which in some 
cases has rendered financial statements almost meaningless.   
 
Debates on the recent series of perceived accounting and auditing failures in the United 
States
21
 and further afield
22
, has again brought into focus the question of whether 
accounting firms should continue to be allowed to provide services other than that of 
audit to their audit clients to limit actual or perceived threads to audit independence and 
resultant impact on audit quality.  Most recently, the role of auditors has come under 
renewed scrutiny after the 2008/09 financial crisis, partly because of the profession’s 
failure to give warning of banking collapses (see the House of Lords review into the role 
of Audit, HoL, 2011). 
 
An area of particular concern continues to be the closeness of the relationship between 
the auditor and the client and the effect that the extensive provision to audit clients of 
services other than audit has had on the external auditor.  Concerns about the long 
association between the auditor and the client has been raised in the UK by Sir David 
Tweedie, the former chairman of the International Accounting Standards Board, and 
current president of ICAS, who in April 2012 describing the estimated 48 years that a 
FTSE 100 auditor remains in place on average, as “pretty cosy”, and expressing the view 
that the independence of auditors may be insufficiently protected by rules requiring lead 
audit partners to be changed after several years (Financial Times, April 4, 2012).   
 
In the United States, concerns about the effect of joint provision has led to further 
prohibitions and restrictions on those services that audit firms can offer to their clients. In 
the United Kingdom, where the approach traditionally has been to focus and rely on 
safeguards and controls within the audit firms rather than on specific prescriptions, the 
issue has recently been deliberated within a prominent discussion and evaluation of the 
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 For example, Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, Xerox. 
22
 For example, Elan in the Republic of Ireland. 
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role of audit with regard to the 2008/09 financial crisis which focused on the role of audit.  
Culminating in the 2010 inquiry by the House of Lords Treasury Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs into market concentration and role of the audit industry (HoL, 2010, 
2011), the narrow field of choice raised concerns about competition and the quality of 
audited accounts, and about possible conflict of interest between audit and consulting 
arms. Particular attention was directed at questions with regard to the potential for 
auditors to have mitigated the banking crisis of 2008/09 by alerting investors to the 
riskiness of the assets held by banks. The inquiry panel showed particular interest in the 
response by the Big Four to the going concern assertions by banks’ management just 
prior to the crisis.  It emerged that the heads of the Big Four were imminently aware of 
the precarious financial situation of major banks by the end of 2007 and that: 
 
 ‘All four of the people here [In reference to the heads of the Big Four 
present during the inquiry] had detailed discussions, instigated by the Big 
Four, with Lord Myners because of the circumstances we were in. It was 
recognised that the banks would only be going concerns if there was support 
forthcoming.’ 
John Connolly (Deloitte), HoL, 2010, p.27. 
 
It emerged that the Big Four had been assured of unlimited UK government support for 
the banks in a letter by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Myners (in response to 
a request by the Big Four for clarification on the position of the UK government with 
regard to support of large financial institutions) indicating that the UK government 
remained, 
 
‘...committed to taking whatever action necessary to maintain financial 
stability, protect depositors and protect the taxpayer.  The support the 
Government is providing to the financial system and the statements it has 
made are factors that will no doubt be taken into account in determining 
whether companies will continue to operate on a going concern basis.’ 
  
Letter by Lord Myners to John-Griffith Jones, KPMG (17 December, 2008), copy provided 
to the House of Lords 
 
This was interpreted by the Big Four to provide sufficient evidence for the going concern 
assertions by banks’ management and thus allow the issuance of unmodified audit 
opinions. Lord Lawson of Blaby expressed his astonishment to this justification (as did 
the Chairman): 
 
‘It seems to me that you’re saying that you noticed that they were on very 
thin ice but you were completely relaxed about it because you knew that 
there would be support; in other words the taxpayer would support them, so 
there was no problem. That’s what it seems to me you just said.’ 
 
Lord Lawson of Blaby (HoL, 2010, p.28) 
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Reflecting on subsequent expressions by the heads of the Big Four of the 
appropriateness of accepting the going concern assertion by banks’ management in 
response to the governments’ assurance on unlimited support for the industry, Lord 
Lipsey noted critically: 
 
‘I have an increasing Alice in Wonderland feeling about this discussion, quite 
frankly. I’m a naïve amateur in this field but I expect “going concern” to mean 
that a business can pay its debts as they fall due, but you meant something 
quite different. You meant the Government will dip into its pockets and give 
the company the money and then it can pay its debts as they fall due and 
you gave an unqualified audit report on that basis. If you had said, “We are 
satisfied that support will be available from Government that will enable it to 
continue as a going concern”, of course you wouldn’t be subject to this 
criticism. But instead, where your duty is to report to investors the true state 
of the company, you were giving a statement that was deliberately designed 
to mislead markets and investors as to the true state of those banks. That 
seems to me to be a very strange thing for an auditor to do.’ 
 
Lord Lipsey (HoL, 2010, p.37) 
 
Expressing overall disappointment in their final report into the role of audit, the Lords 
failed to accept that auditors did all that was required of them, found defence of auditors 
with regard to audit quality disconcertingly complacent, has serious misgivings about 
auditors’ assessment of managements’ going concern assertion, and specifically did not 
accept that the prospects of a bailout by government should at any time be a decisive 
consideration in making the ‘going concern’ judgment (HoL, 2011 paras. 133, 142, 144-
151, 199).   
 
In its recommendations, the Select Committee on Economic Affairs (Hol, 2011) made 
reference to and voiced opinions on the competition in the audit market, mandatory joint 
audit, mandatory tendering of audit contracts, the provision of non-audit services to audit 
clients, and the provision of broader assurance to users of financial statements (including 
on such matters related to risk management, the firm’s business model and the business 
review).  While not considering that a complete ban on the provision of non-audit services 
to audit clients, the Select Committee recommended a ban on the provision of internal 
audit, tax advisory services, and advice to audit client risk committee (with additional 
recommendation that the Office of Fair Trading examine grounds for the prohibition of 
other services to be carried out by a company’s external auditor, HoL, 2011, para. 87).  In 
response to its considerable concerns on the role of audit, audit quality, and audit market 
concentration, the House of Lords further recommended that the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) conduct an investigation into the audit market.  The OFT subsequently announced 
its decision to refer concerns related to audit market concentration to the Competition 
Commission on Friday 21 October 2011. 
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At EU level, concerns on the independence of audit, have led to the proposal to with 
particular considerations given to requirements for mandatory audit firm rotation, 
tendering, and a ban on the provision of NAS to audit clients regarding the statutory audit 
of public-interest entities, such as banks, insurance companies and listed companies, 
envisage measures to enhance auditor independence and to make the statutory audit 
market more dynamic (EC, 2011, COM(2011) 779 final) with details of the key suggested 
measures as set out below:
23
 
Mandatory rotation of audit firms: Audit firms will be required to rotate after a maximum 
engagement period of 6 years (with some exceptions). A cooling off period of 4 years is 
applicable before the audit firm can be engaged again by the same client. The period 
before which rotation is obligatory can be extended to 9 years if joint audits are 
performed, i.e. if the entity being audited appoints more than one audit firm to carry out its 
audit, thus potentially improving the quality of the audit performed by applying the "four-
eyes principle". Joint audits are not made obligatory but are thus encouraged.  
Mandatory tendering: Public-interest entities will be obliged to have an open and 
transparent tender procedure when selecting a new auditor. The audit committee (of the 
audited entity) should be closely involved in the selection procedure.
24
 
Non-audit services: Audit firms will be prohibited from providing non-audit services to 
their audit clients. In addition, large audit firms will be obliged to separate audit activities 
from non-audit activities in order to avoid all risks of conflict of interest.  
European supervision of the audit sector: In addition, given the global context of audit, it 
is important that coordination of and cooperation on the oversight of audit networks is 
ensured both at EU level as well as internationally. Therefore, the Commission proposes 
that the coordination of the auditor supervision activities is ensured within the framework 
of the European Markets and Securities Authority (ESMA). 
Enabling auditors to exercise their profession across Europe: The Commission proposes 
the creation of a Single Market for statutory audits by introducing a European passport for 
the audit profession. To this end, the Commission proposals will allow audit firms to 
provide services across the EU and to require all statutory auditors and audit firms to 
comply with international auditing standards when carrying out statutory audits.  
                                                 
23
 Final amendments to the EC's proposal were originally due by November, 2012, but 
are now not expected until 2013.  The investigation by the UK’s Competition Commission 
into the Big Four’s dominance of the FTSE 350 audit market, announced delays in 
publications of provisional and final findings into 2013 (Accountancy Age, 17 Oct 2012). 
24
 In the UK, the FRC on 28 September 2012 required FTSE 350 companies to put their 
audit contract out to tender at least once a decade or explain to shareholders why they 
did not do so. 
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In this context we note the concerns earlier expressed by the Treasury Select Committee 
investigating the banking crisis as to the joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
and their call for immediate consultation on this issue by the Auditing Practices Board of 
the Financial Reporting Council:
25
 
‘We remain concerned about the issue of auditor independence. Although 
independence is just one of several determinants of audit quality, we 
believe that, as economic agents, audit firms will face strong incentives to 
temper critical opinions of accounts prepared by executive boards, if 
there is a perceived risk that non-audit work could be jeopardised. 
Representatives of the investor community told us of their scepticism that 
audit independence could be maintained under such circumstances. This 
problem is exacerbated by the concentration of audit work in so few 
major firms. We strongly believe that investor confidence, and trust in 
audit would be enhanced by a prohibition on audit firms conducting non-
audit work for the same company, and recommend that the Financial 
Reporting Council consult on this proposal at the earliest opportunity.’  
 
Treasury - Ninth Report Banking Crisis: reforming corporate governance and pay in the 
City. 15 May 2009, para 237. 
 
The Treasury report expressed concerns over the joint provision of audit and NAS and 
the potentially negative effect of NAS on firms’ ability to issue an independent audit 
opinion and suggested banning the practice of audit firms providing NAS alongside audits 
and to their clients.  These concerns were reflected upon during a consultation by the 
APB on audit firms providing NAS to listed companies they audit (APB, 2009, para. 3.2), 
suggesting that: 
 
(a) the nature of some services increases the possibility that the views of 
the auditor will become aligned with the views of the company's 
management (e.g. where the auditor has extensively advised on a 
corporate restructuring or a strategic acquisition);  
 
(b) the greater the volume and financial significance of the non-audit 
services provided by the auditor, the greater the risk that the auditor will 
have relationship and economic reasons not to challenge management's 
views and positions with the requisite degree of energy and scepticism;  
                                                 
25
 In response to the Treasury Select Committee's recommendation, the Auditing 
Practices Board (APB) in October 2009 issued a consultation paper (APB, 2009) on audit 
firms providing non-audit services to listed companies that they audit, and a subsequent 
feedback and consultation paper (APB, 2010a) providing a summary of responses to the 
earlier consultation paper and setting out explanation for proposed amendments to APB 
Ethical Standards for Auditors and FRC Guidance on Audit Committees.  The Auditing 
Practices Board (APB) was established in April 2002, and replaced a previous APB which 
had been in place since 1991. The APB became part of the Financial Reporting Council 
in 2003.  From June 2012, work on audit and assurance will be carried out within the 
FRC by the Audit and Assurance Council, which formally replaced the APB. 
35 
 
 
(c) prohibitions on auditors providing audit services to their listed clients 
could enhance the opportunities for mid-sized accountancy firms to provide 
those services, thereby enhancing their profile and, in turn, leading to 
greater competition and choice in the accounting services and audit 
market;   
 
(d) auditors cannot be relied upon to assess objectively whether a 
particular non-audit service engagement gives rise to threats to auditor 
independence and objectivity and apply appropriate safeguards. 
 
Beyond this there has been the UK government’s response via the Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills to the EU Green Paper on Audit.
26
  Following on from that 
the deliberations of the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee as to the role of non-
audit service provision to audit clients.  Whilst not recommending a complete ban on the 
provision of such services the Committee did recommend a ban on the provision of 
internal audit and perhaps more importantly on tax advisory services and advice to the 
risk committee. It also recommends that the Office of Fair Trading should examine 
whether any other services should be banned from being carried out by a firm’s external 
auditors.
27
 
 
The October 2011 decision by the House of Lords to refer the Big Four audit and 
accounting firms for review by the Office of Fair Trading will also have implications with 
respect to issues relating to the provision of non-audit services.
28
  Even more recently – 
November 2011 - has been the revised draft EU Green Paper which has continued to put 
forward the possible separation of audit and non-audit services provided to clients within 
audit firms, the separation of audit services from non-audit services for large audit firms, 
and mandatory rotation of audit firms after a maximum engagement period. 
 
At the House of Lords inquiry (HoL, 2010, 2011), the international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS), criticised as being more rule-based compared to the UK GAAP, was 
deemed to have restricted the exercise of prudent judgement by auditors, and impairing 
the true and fair view and substance over form principle. Concerns were raised 
specifically on the effect of mark-to-market accounting and the recognition only of 
incurred losses and not expected losses on the financial statements of banks. This could 
                                                 
26
 See http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/u/10-1346-uk-
government-response-ec-green-paper-on-audit. 
27
 House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee – Second report Auditors: Market 
concentration and their role. March 2011. para 87. 
28
 OFT press release 21/10/2011, see http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2011/115-11. 
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result in inflated valuations during the boom, allowing bonuses to be paid out of profits 
that have not taken account of possible losses. 
 
The House of Lords inquiry (HoL, 2010, 2011) reveals that the lack of auditor 
independence may not be the cause of the financial crisis. It was noted that the Big Four 
did highlight the issues to the Bank of England, although the warning bells should 
arguably have been rung earlier, and only issued unqualified audit reports upon receiving 
assurance that the banks will receive unlimited government support to prevent their 
failure. The main issue may therefore not be the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services but the auditor’s lack of scepticism, incompetency, and the expectation gap (see 
Porter et al. 2008 for a summary on the expectations gap). 
 
Auditor’s lack of scepticism is evident in various cases. PwC’s inability to recognise the 
risky business model of Northern Rock where short-term borrowing is used to fund long-
term lending is a classic example. The credit crunch resulting from the sub-prime United 
States market should have also alerted the auditors of the financial health of institutions 
in the United Kingdom. The House of Lords inquiry also expressed doubts as to whether 
the auditors assessed the models used for the valuation of the banks’ complex financial 
instruments. 
 
Incompetence may be an issue particularly with bank audits. The House of Lords inquiry 
revealed that the chairs of audit companies of major banks may have had no more than a 
vague understanding of models used in the valuation of banks’ financial instruments, and 
that auditors may have been over-reliant on the valuations provided by audit clients. 
Clearly, if this were the case, the audit function would have failed in its role as the 
‘guardian’ of the capital market.   
 
There may also be a gap between the auditors’ perception of what is expected and that 
of stakeholders in general. Drawing evidence from the House of Lords inquiry (HoL, 
2011), the auditors believe that their primary role is to count the score and neither to 
forecast next year’s profit nor to look at the business model of the company. There is also 
a fear, specifically in bank audits, that a qualified audit opinion may cause a collapse of 
confidence and be detrimental to shareholders. However, the principles established over 
four decades ago by Moffitt, J in Pacific Acceptance Corporation Limited v Forsyth and 
Others (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 29 indicate that it is the auditor’s duty to report all material 
matters to shareholders regardless of whether that public disclosure involves an adverse 
reflection on the board, a director, or senior executive, or will be detrimental to the 
company (or its shares). 
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7.0 Changes in the Nature of Audit 
 
Whereas the dramatic growth in the provision of non-audit services up to about a decade 
ago can be directly observed, it is more difficult to determine the extent and nature of the 
evolutionary change in the audit role.  The formal audit requirements in terms of the 
provision of an opinion as to the truth and fairness of the view presented by the financial 
statements has not changed but in the 1990s there was an observable shift in the 
perception of the capabilities and benefits of audit – a shift accompanied and to an extent 
led by, changes in audit approach and methodology.  A simplified paradigm of the 
historical development of audit sees development from substantive audit via system and 
audit risk-based approaches to the business risk model, with a more recent reversion to 
an audit risk approach.  The substantive approach was balance sheet oriented focusing 
on obtaining direct evidence to support the existence, ownership and valuation of the 
assets and liabilities in the balance sheet.  As the size and complexity of business entities 
grew, and their internal control systems became more extensive and more reliable, 
systems-based audit, in which the confidence in the financial statement numbers was 
derived in part from testing the systems used to generate those numbers, came to the 
fore.  One attraction of this approach to the audit firms was the linkage to their developing 
consulting activities in particular those relating to the installation and management of IT-
based financial systems. 
 
The 1980s saw the widespread adoption of audit approaches based on the audit risk 
model, as first set out in the US auditing standards in SAS 99, in which the overall risk of 
an audit failure in terms of an inappropriate opinion was modelled as the product of the 
likelihood of error occurring in the financial statements, the likelihood of client systems 
preventing or detecting that error and the likelihood of audit tests detecting any otherwise 
undetected error.  In recent years the firms have sought to further revise and refine their 
audit procedures to incorporate a wider assessment of risk and have shifted the focus 
away from audit risk per se toward client risk and client risk management practices.  The 
extensive rhetoric accompanying and publicising this change has portrayed it as an 
evolution in keeping with, and necessitated by, environmental changes in the economy 
and in ways of doing business.  Audit had become a ‘risk based, strategic systems, 
methodology’ fit for ‘the economy of the 21
st
 Century’.
29
 
 
Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of a business risk or a value-added 
approach to audit there is rather less agreement, or indeed evidence, as to its application 
                                                 
29
 KPMG (1999, p.4) quoted in Humphrey et al. (2003). 
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or indeed how radical a departure it is from previous audit practice.
30
  In a study designed 
to add to knowledge of how the business risk approach is operationalised, Lemon et al. 
(2000) identify the main structural components of the business risk audit approach to be: 
 
a) A consideration of business risk in the general sense of the risk that the entity will 
fail to achieve its objectives. 
b) A greater focus on acquiring knowledge of the client’s business and a more 
structured approach to the gathering of relevant information. 
c) A wider perception of the organizational framework away from the narrow 
perspective of the picture represented in the financial statements. 
d) A closer alignment with the management’s view of the entity and a closer co-
operation with management in the conduct of the audit and the setting of audit 
objectives. 
 
In terms of evidence gathering the business risk approach may be seen as placing more 
emphasis on the testing of high level management controls and less on more detailed 
controls.  These high level controls include relevant aspects of the control environment 
and corporate governance as well as controls over process.  The extent of substantive 
testing is reduced (Power, 2000) but in its place analytical procedures are given 
enhanced prominence as being ‘consistent with the auditor’s desire to understand the 
entity’s business rather than simply prove the financial statement figures’.
31
  In turn, the 
nature of analytical procedures has become more sophisticated with, it is claimed, the 
greater use of analytical software, broader-based data sets and benchmarking. 
 
The business risk approach – and indeed the whole concept of the delivery of assurance 
services over and above audit – has been closely associated with the parallel rise in the 
provision of services other than audit.  Jeppesen (1998) refers to the expansion of the 
scope of audit as a ‘reinvention’ of audit (p.525) and claims that the focus on risk and 
strategic objectives has led to a blurring of the traditional distinction between auditing and 
other services provided by the accounting and audit firm.   
‘To some extent auditing has become consulting and it makes 
increasingly little sense distinguishing between the two as the 
boundary between them is eroded by the ‘reinvention’ of auditing’ 
(p.526), a view echoed by a North American large firm partner who 
stated: ‘there is a continuum in the whole audit advisory services 
area.  I don’t think it’s any more possible to define discrete 
breakpoints.’ (Boritz and Cockburn, 1998, p.142). 
                                                 
30
 As Humphrey et al. (2003) note, Auditing Through a Strategic-Systems Lens:  the 
KPMG Business Measurement Process (Bell et al., 1997) although widely regarded as an 
important technical expression of the new philosophy of auditing (Power, 2000) is in fact 
short on detail as to specific procedures introduced or modified by business risk audit 
methodology’. 
31
 Lemon et al. (2000) 
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The Enron scandal however, and resultant shifts to re-regulation of the industry (Kinney, 
2005), as represented by the SOX Act (2002) in the US, and similar regulatory changes 
in the UK and elsewhere (Lennox, 2009), have brought about a move away from the 
business risk approach towards one which once again may be focused on an audit risk 
model. 
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8.0 Arguments against the Provision of Non-Audit 
Services to Audit Clients 
 
As noted above, the primary regulatory concern has always been that the provision of 
non-audit services to auditor clients constitutes a threat to auditor independence in 
particular in terms of: enhanced fee dependence; the possibility of the auditor being 
required to critically appraise work carried out by other members of the accounting firm; 
and greater familiarity with and psychological dependence upon client management. 
Each of these threats are now considered in turn. 
 
8.1 Enhanced Fee Dependence 
 
In the United Kingdom and the United States auditors are 100% fee dependent upon 
their clients irrespective of whether or not non-audit services are supplied. The loss of an 
audit client will result in the loss of that stream of income which will in turn have 
implications for the firm and also, as is increasingly being recognised, for the fortunes 
within that firm of the individual managers and partners associated with that client. There 
are however cogent reasons for believing that pressures on auditors to acquiesce to 
inappropriate client accounting procedures are greater when the accounting firm also 
benefits from substantial non-audit service revenue from that audit client. Although there 
is little direct confirmatory empirical evidence, there is a strong perception that the loss of 
an audit client is also likely to lead to the loss of the stream of associated non-audit 
services – services which are conventionally perceived to be more profitable than audit 
per se. In forming an opinion or not as to the suitability of a client’s accounting practices 
an audit partner – or the team of partners which is likely to be associated with a decision 
to qualify or threaten qualification of a set of financial statements - is unlikely not to be 
mindful of the overall fee income which the client represents to the firm.
 32,33
 
 
Indeed critics of the profession in the UK and the United States have alleged that 
accounting firms ‘low ball’ tenders for audit, i.e. price the audit below cost, for the purpose 
of gaining access to lucrative non-audit services and quote specific examples where 
incoming auditors have undercut the outgoing auditors in respect to the audit fee and 
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 When reviewing their association with Enron at a client retention meeting in February 
2001, Andersen were clearly aware of the overall fee link when discussing the possibility 
of combined audit and non-audit fees rising from $52m ($25m audit, $27m non-audit) to 
$100m (Powers et al., 2002, p.) 
33
 The SEC heard evidence as to the ‘subtle but powerful psychological factors [that] 
skew the perceptions and judgments of persons – including auditors – who have a stake 
in the outcome of those judgments.’ (SEC, 2000). See also  Bazerman et al. (1997). 
41 
 
then benefited from a very substantial rise in subsequent non-audit service fee income.
34
 
Of course individual cases may be driven by specific factors and the wider empirical 
evidence to support this view is not necessarily compelling. Nevertheless, in the opinion 
of the authors, it would be naïve to believe that individual auditors
35
 and audit firms can 
entirely divorce themselves from such considerations when making operational and 
pricing audit decisions. 
 
8.2 Review of Work by Other Members of the Accounting Firm 
 
Concerns as to the auditor being put in a situation where they are effectively auditing 
their own work have been raised primarily in respect to situations where the audit firm 
has been responsible for advice on or the actual installation of client financial and related 
systems. The worry is essentially that the auditor will either be reluctant to probe too far 
into the operation and output of such systems, or if they find evidence that they are 
malfunctioning, will be reluctant to report this finding to client management or to a wider 
audience. Although concerns are normally couched in terms of the provision of financial 
systems one could conceive of possible conflicts of interest arising across a range of 
non-audit service provision including inter alia internal audit, taxation, personnel 
selection, corporate finance. Here again empirical evidence as to the scale and extent of 
such a problem is very limited. 
 
8.3 The relationship with Management 
 
Perhaps the greatest threat to auditor independence deriving from the provision of non-
audit services to audit clients lies in terms of the implications for relationship between 
client management and the auditor and the effect that this has in turn upon the audit 
approach. For much of the twentieth century, in the United Kingdom at least, the wider 
perception of the auditor was that of a quasi-judicial monitor of the accuracy of client 
financial reporting. Although the auditor was economically dependent upon its clients, 
auditor independence was strengthened by relatively low levels of competition for existing 
clients and the greater relative importance of the professional bodies both in the wider 
commercial world and vis-à-vis the audit firms themselves. Relationships between 
company management and the auditor appear to have been more formal and more 
distant than they are today. However greater competition between audit firms and in 
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 Similar concerns were expressed by a number of parties giving evidence to the SEC 
hearings ahead of approval of its new independence rules (SEC, 2000) and indeed 
previously by the then Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, in a speech in 1996: ‘The 
auditing function should be the very soul of the public accounting profession, not a loss-
leader retained as a foot in the door for higher-fee consulting services’ (quoted in Pitt and 
Birenbaum, 1997 at p.50 fn.109). 
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 See Gwilliam (1987, p.104) and Trompeter (1994) for discussion of incentives facing 
individual partners and aspiring partners within accounting firms. 
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particular the desire for fee growth through the sale of non-audit services to the client has 
significantly changed the relationship between auditor and client.  
 
Whereas in the United Kingdom the company auditor is de jure, if not necessarily de 
facto, appointed by the shareholders and the audit report is addressed to the 
shareholder, as a consultant the accounting firm acts in a capacity similar to that of any 
outside contractor and is essentially at the behest of company management. In setting up 
tax avoidance schemes for the client, or in as in the case of Enron helping to construct 
special purpose entities designed to be at the very edge of what might be considered to 
be acceptable accounting practice,
36
 the auditor is both providing a service to 
management and also comes to perceive the company client from the viewpoint of 
management rather than that of a dispassionate outside observer/monitor. This is likely to 
exacerbate a situation where the interests of the outside shareholders, to whom the 
auditor is reporting but whom lack personification as the auditors has no direct contact or 
dealings with them, consciously or sub-consciously become subordinate to the interests 
of ‘the client’ as personified by client management who have a clear personification and 
frequently a similarity of background, socialisation and training as the senior members of 
the audit team.
37
  
 
8.4 Bias, Scepticism and the Quality of Auditor Judgement 
 
An area for investigation that goes beyond a consideration of direct conflicts of interest 
looks at the potential impact of joint provision on the ability of the auditor to apply an 
appropriate degree of scepticism when performing an audit (APB, 2011, 2012).  The 
importance of scepticism to an auditor’s work has a long history. In his influential 
judgement re Pacific Acceptance Corporation Limited v Forsyth and Others (1970) 92 WN 
(NSW) 29, Moffitt J provided comprehensive guidance on auditors’ duties, confirming or 
establishing a number of important legal principles, subsequently incorporated in auditing 
standards and guidelines. The following three recommendations are of particular 
importance to the current discussion: 
 
1. The duty to audit involves a duty to pay due regard to the possibility that fraud may 
have occurred.  The audit plan and audit tests should be structured so that the 
auditor has a reasonable expectation of detecting material fraud if it exists. 
                                                 
36
 Andersen appear to have been well aware of the limits to which Enron was pushing 
accounting practice. With reference to nine identified high risk practices a 1999 note by 
the engagement partner prepared for briefing the Enron Audit Committee stated: 
‘Obviously, we are on board with all of these, but many push limits and have a high 
‘others could have a different view’ risk profile.’ (US Senate Investigations, 2002, p.17).   
37
 ‘As the auditor becomes increasingly involved with the audit client and its managers, 
the auditor is more likely to perceive himself as part of the management team and place 
less emphasis on his or her primary loyalty to investors.’ (SEC, 2000). 
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2. The auditor has a paramount duty to check material matters for him or herself.  
However, reliance may be placed on enquiries from others where it is reasonable to 
do so.  Nevertheless, reliance on others is to be regarded as an aid to, and not a 
substitute for, the auditor’s own procedures. 
3. The auditor’s duty to report includes a duty to report to shareholders at their general 
meeting any material matters discovered during the audit.  This responsibility cannot 
be shirked on the grounds that it involves an adverse reflection on the board, a 
director, or a senior executive, or on the pretext that public disclosure may damage 
the company.
38
 
 
These legal principles highlight the importance of attention to the potential for fraud, the 
need to collect sufficient and adequate evidence to support (or reject) managerial 
assertions, and duties with regard to reporting material matters to shareholders.  With 
respect to these key issues, a sceptical attitude would appear to be of paramount 
importance to auditor judgement when reviewing audit evidence and managerial 
assertions. The concept of ‘Professional scepticism’ is defined in ISA 200 (para 13) as: 
‘An attitude that includes a questioning mind, being alert to conditions 
which may indicate possible misstatement due to error or fraud, and a 
critical assessment of audit evidence.’  
 
Earlier, the APB (1998) had provided additional insights into what the concept of 
scepticism entails.  It observes:  
‘...scepticism is a personal quality that relates to the attitude of individual 
auditors: it is characterised by a questioning, probing – almost suspicious 
– approach being applied throughout the audit’ (para 3.7).   
 
More recently, the APB (2011b) again reflected on the importance of scepticism in 
conducting an audit when it states: 
‘The application of an appropriate degree of professional scepticism is a 
crucial skill for auditors” (para 1).  
 
The APB (2011b) expressed particular concerns about the range of understanding of the 
term ‘professional scepticism’ within the accountancy profession. While some members 
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  This principle is pertinent to the audits of some UK banks prior to the 2008-9 global 
financial crisis and auditors’ reluctance to report doubts they had about the going concern 
status of the banks.  While the heads of the Big 4 deemed that going concern 
qualifications were not appropriate nor required, given the  Government’s assurance of 
unlimited support for these banks in case of need (see  in the subsequent House of Lords 
enquiry, the Lords noted ‘A going concern qualification was clearly warranted in several 
cases, even if the auditors may understandably have been reluctant to make it … 
[because] they might fear to do so could cause a collapse of confidence and a run on the 
bank, to the detriment of the shareholders and, quite possibly, of the wider public 
interest.’ (House of Lords, 2011, paras 140, 147). 
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of the profession consider that it requires auditors to adopt a neutral position (neither 
assuming the entity’s management is honest or dishonest, nor that the financial 
statements are, or are not, materially misstated), others believe it involves a more 
questioning approach which may be referred to as ‘presumptive doubt’ (APB, 2011b 
paras 23-24). With this interpretation, the APB suggests an almost suspicious approach 
while implying there to be a fine but clear line between auditors adopting a ‘suspicious’ 
rather than ‘sceptical’ approach to an audit.  The move in the concept along an imaginary 
continuum from auditor’s assuming management’s honesty towards assuming dishonesty 
was reflected upon by Bell et al. (2005), who note:   
‘the concept of professionalism [has shifted] from neutrality toward 
presumptive doubt’ (p. 18)   
 
The APB too questions whether a neutral position (or even an ‘inquiring mind’) is an 
appropriate or sufficient position for an auditor to adopt and points to ‘an element of 
‘doubt’ [underlying] a number of requirements in Auditing Standards’ (ABP, 2011b, para 
27).  In further refinement of its concerns, the APB (2012, p.4) analyses factors which 
may affect an auditor’ ability to apply the necessary scepticism when conducting an audit:  
 
“The disposition to believe or disbelieve an assertion may be conditioned 
by many influences.  These include not only the results of inquiry but also 
potentially the biases of the individual (whether conscious or sub-
conscious) and the individual’s perceptions and assessments of their self-
interest.  These other conditioning influences must be filtered out if 
objective truth is to be attained. In the context of audit judgments, it may be 
helpful to understand the implications of the behavioural rules (‘heuristics’) 
underlying human decision-making and judgment processes.  A number of 
heuristics have been proposed to help explain these processes, especially 
in the face of complex problems or incomplete information. It is also 
thought that they may, in some circumstances, introduce systematic errors 
or biases into these processes. What is needed to counteract this is a 
mechanism to encourage a structured consideration of the alternative point 
of view.  One example of such a mechanism being applied in a financial 
services context is ‘reverse stress testing’.  In this form of stress testing, 
the directors consider what it would take to make the entity fail and then 
assess the evidence as to the likelihood of those circumstances arising.” 
 
The APB’s 2012 review of scepticism tries to establish a common definition and 
understanding of the concept, underlining its critical role in delivering audit quality.  In line 
with the FRC’s increased recognition of the intrusion of bias on decision-making and its 
impact on the quality of decisions at board level (see FRC, 2011), the APB focuses on 
behavioural factors which can diminish the scepticism applied during audit. The APB’s 
interpretation of the concept of scepticism and its focus on the impact of heuristics and 
bias on judgement underlines the fundamental importance of independence in mind (as 
opposed to formal independence) of the auditor. 
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A crucial ingredient in establishing the value of an external audit, accepting the 
judgements made therein, and the quality of the ultimate audit opinion, is an auditor’s 
recognition of factors which may affect their judgement and the implementation of 
procedures which diminish the impact of bias. An underlying assumption of much 
standard setting has been that the auditing process can be impartial and free of bias 
(Prentice, 2000a,b; Bazerman et al. 2002a,b; Marnet, 2008). Presumably, this can be 
achieved if an auditor of ‘good standing’, ‘watches out’ for potential conflicts of interest 
and bias, and tries ‘hard enough’ to be neutral. Perceptions of repeated failures of the 
auditing process disturb this idealized picture and have given rise to a degree of cynicism 
with the accounting profession.   
 
It would certainly be desirable for auditors to live up to the rationality ideal as outlined in 
the conventional model of economics. However, limitations on information and 
processing capacity are especially pronounced in the complex and variable environment 
in which auditors operate.
39
  Since “… judging and deciding are inherent in every phase 
of the audit process…”
40
 an auditor would appear to be the classical decision maker 
under uncertainty. This is especially true in light of “… the general tendency to view the 
entirety of GAAP… as laws or rules to be interpreted and manipulated, rather than 
applied in a spirit of professional judgment."  (Hendrickson and Espahbodi, 1991, p. 26).  
 
Accounting uncertainty has been found to negatively impact auditor objectivity despite 
potential damage to auditor reputation from this (Mayhew et al., 2001). Uncertainty may 
motivate auditors to agree with clients’ interpretations (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996), 
and the tendency towards clients’ interpretation has been found particularly pronounced 
where prior evidence was mixed (Salterio and Koonce, 1997). This places auditors in the 
unenviable centre of complex interactions between a raft of heuristics and cognitive 
influences, which question the feasibility of an auditor’s work to escape self-serving bias. 
Independence issues may be aggravated by increased competition in the auditing 
industry, particularly by the increase in importance of non-auditing services provided by 
accounting firms. 
 
The intrusion of bias in the client working relationship may be inevitable, and operate 
even in the absence of financial incentives and motivation. This would make auditor 
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 “The audit process and its environment are complex and variable. An audit takes 
several months to complete and is itself part of an ongoing process incorporating past 
audits, intervening events and expectations about events that may occur subsequent to 
the audit.” (Gibbins and Wolf, 1982, p. 107). 
40
 Solomon and Shields (1995, p. 139); also, “Auditors express opinions based on 
investigations that, no matter how thorough, inevitably involve subjective judgments.” 
(Hogarth, 1991, p. 277). Jiambalvo and Wilner (1985) find that there is often substantial 
disagreement among trained auditors regarding the proper outcome for a particular 
problem. 
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impartiality an impossible ideal (Bazerman et al., 1997, 2002a,b; O’Connor, 2002), and 
suggests the need for additional instruments to counter bias, including periodic auditor 
rotation (at partner and at firm level) and increased independent review of an auditors’ 
work. As the result of selective interpretation of ambiguous information that goes into a 
financial report, and the weight of earlier interpretations, an auditor’s judgment is almost 
certainly biased in favour of their own and clients’ interests (Bazerman et al., 1997). Self-
serving bias in an auditing setting can be exacerbated by a number of factors. These 
include the distance and anonymity between the potential victims of misrepresentation 
and the auditor, as opposed to the closeness and familiarity of the people in the client 
firm who could be hurt if a negative audit opinion were issued. Also, repercussions from a 
negative opinion are likely to be immediate and substantial, as opposed to the temporally 
distant and only potential negative repercussions from having made a mis-statement.
 41
   
 
Prentice (2000a) questions the assumption that an accountant always adheres to the 
rational actor ideal, and dismisses the view that the potential or actual loss of reputation 
is a reliable deterrent to fraudulent or negligent auditing. Auditors tend to satisfice 
(Simon, 1955), rather than optimize. This might be inconsistent with a Bayesian 
application of probability, but is entirely rational from a cognitive cost-benefit perspective 
as it economizes on the cost of analysis (Asare and Wright, 1997; Gigerenzer and Todd, 
1999). Auditors use rules of thumb, or heuristics, to guide them, even when objective 
methods could be more effective (McDaniel and Kinney, 1995; Asare and Wright, 1997). 
Auditors have been found to utilize a number of specific heuristics, including the 
representativeness heuristic (Uecker and Kinney, 1977; Smith and Kida, 1991; Kellogg 
and Kellogg, 1991), anchoring and adjustment (Joyce and Biddle, 1981a,b; Bonner and 
Pennington, 1991; Bedard and Wright; 1994; Hirst and Koonce, 1996), and availability 
(Bonner and Pennington, 1991; Haynes and Kachelmeier, 1998). Auditors are subject to 
cognitive dissonance and escalation of commitment (Weick, 1983). Auditors display a 
strong tendency to seek and use confirmatory rather than disconfirmatory evidence 
(Waller and Felix, 1984), and to self-rationalize decisions (Peecher, 1996). 
 
Memory is critically important to avoiding audit errors, and overconfidence in their 
memories can lead auditors to commit reckless errors by failing to check working papers 
before reaching conclusions (Ramsay, 1994). General audit experience may not improve 
memory tasks (Johnson, 1994). Compounding this, there seems to be little correlation 
between auditors’ confidence in their ability to make going-concern judgments, and their 
accuracy in actual judgements (Kida, 1984). This reflects overconfidence in their own 
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 Bazerman et al. (2002a,b) argue that very little association with a client is required to 
produce biased judgments and identify a number of structural aspects of accounting 
which encourage biased judgment:  Ambiguity, Attachment, and Approval.  Socio-
psychological factors including familiarity, discounting, and escalation contribute to the 
bias introduced by these structural aspects. 
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abilities (Kent and Weber, 1998) and possibly also in self-perceptions of ethics (Cohen et 
al., 1995). Tax professionals (including accountants) have been found to be highly 
susceptible to biases toward the client preference (Kahle and White, 2004). Auditors’ risk-
taking tendencies have been found to generally conform to the predictions of prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) with regard to risk preferences, where a decision 
maker tends to be risk averse in a gain situation, and risk seeking in a loss situation 
(Jegers, 1991; Schisler, 1994; Cohen and Trompeter, 1998). Affective reactions can 
somewhat reverse this behaviour of risk avoidance (seeking) in gain (loss) contexts, 
indicating that such contextual variables may have a significant influence on risky 
behaviour (Moreno et al., 2002).
42
 
 
Auditing practice and regulation should take the persistence of bias into consideration in 
order to increase the reliability of financial reports. This seems particularly relevant as the 
discussion has shown that self-serving judgments, fraudulent intentions, and deliberate 
misleading are not necessary for the provision of false, incorrect, or grossly misleading 
audits, at least not initially. Bias can be strictly separated from motivation, though 
motivation may (and usually does) subsequently contribute to further biased perception 
and judgement. The mere proximity to the client is sufficient to introduce bias in 
perception, interpretation, and judgement of the professional, to result in audit 
interpretations favourable to the client (Zajonc, 1968; Bazerman et al., 2002a). 
Subsequent pressures to self-justify initial acceptance of accounting interpretations tend 
to lead to yet closer affiliation with the client’s view. Hence, while it may only involve small 
steps from initial bias to self-serving motivation and finally to fraudulent behaviour, bias 
can affect audits before any motive and intent for fraud enters the equation. This is in 
stark contrast to assumption of deliberate intent by individuals of rational choice theories, 
and policy making and legal practice based on its predictions. It must be recognized that 
bias affects the perception and cognitive processing stages long before any conscious 
choice takes place. Traditional economic theory, generally assumes that choice is a 
process of consciously weighing the costs and benefits of an event or decision. While this 
may be the intention of an individual, and can certainly form one part of the choice 
making process, biased perceptions and information processing would appear to 
influence this process long before (as well as during) such deliberations. 
 
Current legislation may not sufficiently consider impartiality in the audit process. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, for example, aims directly at fraud, but fails to strongly address 
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 Moreno et al. (2002) find that subjects reject decision alternatives which elicit negative 
affect in favour of alternatives which elicit positive affect. Subjects appear to consider 
both financial data and affective value when considering alternatives, even if this is at the 
cost of economic value. This indicates that decision behaviour may be the result of a 
complex interaction between default strategies (such as prospect theory), the decision 
context, and affective reaction. 
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the problem of bias.
43
 It is not obvious how unconscious bias would be deterred by the threat 
of increased punishment (Bazerman et al., 1997; 2002a,b), and  “… a growing consensus that 
the law must do something more (or different) than simply relying on its conventional strategy 
of vicarious corporate liability in order to induce good monitoring” (Langevoort, 2001, p. 2). The 
problem for policy makers is how to minimise the unconscious biases the auditor is subject to 
in everyday dealings with clients, and at the same time enhance the impact of rules on more 
conscious and motivated bias, and fraudulent intent.
44
  Impartiality is difficult to achieve, some 
would say impossible, as all individuals are biased towards their own interests or prejudices, 
and affected by proximity to peers and clients. While an auditor may indeed be of very high 
integrity, and consciously strive towards providing judgements that are ‘true and fair’, 
behavioural research points to the difficulty of escaping bias and heuristics that skew 
perception. There is no reason to assume that stronger penalties alone would deter activities 
where deterrence has failed in the past, as a gatekeeper can be expected to rationalize (i.e., 
distort the objective interpretation of) their own actions to comply with accepted norms, and 
may downplay potential risk from penalties with a frequently observed focus on perceived 
short term gains that ignores potential long-term costs. 
The APB (2012) considers scepticism to be a cornerstone of audit quality – as the quality 
of audit judgement ultimately defines audit quality - and sets out conditions necessary for 
auditors to demonstrate the achievement of an appropriate degree of professional 
scepticism.  In making reference to heuristics and biases in its discussion of the 
importance of scepticism to audit, the APB (2012) goes significantly beyond established 
analyses of scepticism that focus on reliance on professional conduct (see, for example, 
the ISAs released by the IASSB which critically depend on auditor scepticism, including: 
ISA 200, 220, 240, 315, 330, 505, 520, 540, 550, 570, 700).  
 
Instead, the APB (2012) suggests that auditors critically appraise managerial assertions 
by actively looking out for risks of material misstatements, and to design audit procedures 
which consider whether there is any evidence that would contradict management 
assertions (rather than merely consider the extent to which management has provided 
evidence that is consistent with them).   This recognizes auditor’s susceptibility to 
heuristics and biases and indicates the need for the systematic use of procedures 
designed to counter and mitigate the effects of bias on auditor judgement and quality of 
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 With regard to auditor independence, see SEC (2001), Final Rule: Revision of the 
Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements; and SEC (2003), Strengthening the 
Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence. These, inter alia, define 
and detail cooling off periods of one year before a member of an audit team can join 
client firm in certain key positions, lists categories of prohibited non-audit services, 
mandate partner rotation, and enhance various disclosure and certification requirements. 
44
 By implication, this would also seem to apply to any other gatekeeper, especially, given 
their proximity to management, the members of a board. 
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decision-making, prior to and during engagement, in order to enhance the reliability on 
and value of expressed audit opinion.
45
 
 
8.5 The Market For Non-Audit Services 
 
A final and rather separate issue relates to the possible distortion of the market for the 
type of consulting and other non-audit services provided by accounting firms in that other 
providers of such services allege that the entrée to clients obtained by means of statutory 
or other regulatory requirements for audit provides an unfair advantage to accounting 
firms as compared with non-accounting firms. Again it is extremely difficult to adduce 
empirical evidence to support this contention. However few of the services offered are 
specific either to accounting firms or non-accounting firms. In the absence of economic 
evidence as to the benefits of the provision of non-audit services to clients (an issue 
discussed further below) then it is unclear whether there would in fact be costs either to 
society or to accounting firms if such provision was prohibited. If accounting firms are 
indeed currently competing on a level playing field with other providers of non-audit 
services (and audit clients are purchasing non-audit services for genuine economic 
reasons) then one would expect a redistribution of the existing pool of audit client non-
audit services between accounting firms. If the playing field is not level then other service 
providers would gain at the expense of accounting firms but it is far from clear that this 
would be economically inefficient. 
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 See the Guidance on Board Effectiveness (FRC, 2011), section 3 ‘Decision Making’ on 
factors which can lead to flawed decision making by individuals and groups charged with 
corporate governance and tentative suggestions for means to minimize the risk of poor 
decisions by designing decision‐making policies and processes aimed at mitigating the 
impact of bias. 
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9.0 Arguments for the Provision of Non-Audit 
Services to Audit Clients 
 
In seeking to protect their freedom to provide non-audit services to their audit clients the 
accountancy firms and the accountancy profession in both the United Kingdom and the 
United States have, over the years, marshalled an impressive array of arguments both 
diverse and overlapping. A number of these are summarised below under the following 
headings: the wider economic benefits; enhanced audit quality; a lack of evidence of user 
concern; a lack of evidence of adverse economic impact; a lack of evidence of 
association between the provision of non-audit services and audit failure; the role of 
professionalism; reputation effects and economic sanctions; and the impact on 
recruitment to the accounting profession. 
 
9.1 Wider Economic Benefits 
 
The very rapid expansion in non-audit service provision to audit clients may be seen as 
indicative of real economic benefits arising from the joint provision of such services 
because of economies of scope. These economies of scope are normally characterised 
as knowledge spill-overs (Simunic, 1984). To intervene in the market by prohibiting the 
provision of non-audit services to audit clients would then reduce economic efficiency. 
 
Although the success of accounting firms in marketing non-audit services to their clients 
is undoubted and is demonstrated by the rapid growth in fee income deriving from such 
services the exact nature of the relevant economies of scope/knowledge spillovers is 
perhaps less easy to establish. Antle et al. (1997) suggest that: 
‘Because auditing, tax work and consulting generate knowledge of 
clients’ organizations, processes and problems, it is intuitive that there 
exist economies of scope in auditing and these non-audit 
services…While quantitative estimates of economies of scope are not 
available, the success of accounting firms in competing in consulting 
markets is testimony to their existence.’
46
  
 
However, empirical research has found it difficult to pin down these advantage in terms of 
reduced audit fees associated with a higher level of non-audit services – indeed the 
majority of pricing studies suggest that firms which purchase a high level of non-audit 
services from their auditors pay rather more than average for their audits. Ezzamel et al. 
(2002) suggest that this positive association may be explicable in terms either of client 
specific differences, for example organizational complexity, ‘or of events giving rise to the 
purchase of more audit and non-audit services rather than in terms of direct economic 
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 p.ii. 
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linkages between the cost functions for audit and non-audit services.’
47
 While definitive 
interpretation of the empirical evidence is fraught with complications, given that audit is 
generally considered to be a service with an inelastic demand function the existence of a 
positive association between the pricing of audit and non-audit services provides little, if 
any, support for the argument that there are extensive economic benefits arising from 
joint provision of audit and non-audit services. 
 
9.2 Enhanced Audit Quality 
 
A linked argument, albeit one at a slight remove, is that the provision of non-audit 
services enhances the auditor’s knowledge base and enables them to carry out a better 
quality audit. Whereas professional writers and the professional bodies have focused on 
independence as a mental construct others, for example Wolnizer (1987), Power (1997), 
have identified the need for auditors to have a knowledge base, whether pre-existing or 
as a result of search and evidential inquiry, which enables them to form an independent 
opinion as to the quality of financial reporting. In the absence of such knowledge an audit 
is likely to degenerate into no more than an acceptance of management representation 
and be of correspondingly little value. As business activity becomes ever more complex 
as a consequence of globalisation and expansion of markets for services and products
48
 
then it is the provision of non-audit services which both adds value to the client and 
provides the auditor with the essential understanding of the mode and nature of the 
client’s activities, an understanding which will underpin the audit opinion. 
 
Such a viewpoint fits comfortably within the portrayal of ‘business risk audit’ as a value 
adding activity situated within the client’s overall risk management strategy with a focus 
on the overall control and corporate governance environment, knowledge of the business 
and a key assessment of management integrity (see Lemon et al. 2000), and also within 
the framework of assurance services and consulting as a continuum with few defining 
break points (see Jeppesen, 1998; Boritz and Cockburn, 1998). There is no doubt that in 
many cases the provision of non-audit services will enable the auditor to have a clearer 
understanding of the nature of the client’s activities and financial transactions. In Enron 
the fact that Andersen provided extensive non-audit services in respect to the setting up 
of a number of the key off balance sheet vehicles which were used to manipulate the 
financial statements clearly provided them with knowledge of the relevant transactions
49
 - 
but in the outcome this did not lead to a higher quality audit.  
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 p.13. 
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 For example the enormous growth in the markets for financial derivatives and for 
contracts and trading in the future supply of energy and related services (as pioneered by 
Enron). 
49
 See the Powers Report (Powers et al., 2002) ‘Andersen billed Enron $5.7million for 
advice in connection with the LJM and Chewco transactions alone, above and beyond its 
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More generally, although the interface between a wider range of service provision and 
enhanced knowledge of the client’s business is intuitively persuasive there is little 
empirical evidence as to how this translates into better quality auditing and some have 
been critical of the whole concept. Sikka and Willmott (1993) in their review of the DTI 
Inspectors’ report on Raodships Limited in 1976 noted that after examining the quality of 
audit by the auditor the inspectors concluded: 
‘We do not accept that there can be the requisite degree of watchfulness 
where a man is checking his own figures or those of a colleague …. For 
these reasons we do not believe that (the auditor) ever achieved the 
standard of independence necessary for a wholly objective audit.’
50
 
 
As auditors of Enron Andersen saw their role as that of providing an ‘integrated audit’ 
combining its outside audit role with extensive internal auditing and consulting services. 
However the accounting and corporate governance experts testifying before the US 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs investigation of the role of the Enron 
directors condemned the very concept of an integrated audit: 
 ‘not only for diluting the outside auditor’s independence, but also for 
reducing the effectiveness of an outside audit by allowing the auditor to 
audit its own work at the company. Mr Sutton called it a ‘terrible idea’ 
while Mr Campbell called it a ‘horrible practice’ and I do not think it should 
be permitted.’
51
 
 
9.3 Lack of Evidence of User Concern 
 
Review studies by Orren (1997) and Kinney (1999) both conclude that the North 
American literature suggests that financial statement users do not share the concerns of 
regulators as to the effects of the provision of non audit services to audit clients,
52
 
notwithstanding the fact that a number of early empirical studies found that as the level of 
non-audit services provision increased, the level of user confidence in auditor 
independence decreased (Lindsay et al., 1987; Pany and Reckers, 1983, and Reckers 
and Stagliano, 1981) and more recently studies by Beattie et al. (1999) and Canning and 
Gwilliam (1999) of UK and Irish financial statement users respectively both suggest that 
increasing levels of fees from non-audit services can impair the perception of auditor 
                                                                                                                                     
regular audit fees.’ (p.5) and ‘Andersen’s total bill for Raptor-related work came to 
approximately $1.3million. Indeed there is abundant evidence that Andersen in fact 
offered Enron advice at every step, from inception through restructuring and ultimately to 
terminating the Raptors.’ p.132. 
50
 p.9. 
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 Report 107 – 70, July 2002, ‘The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s Collapse’, 
p.58. 
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 Orren states ‘Most studies have found that non-auditing services have minimal effects 
on the appearance of auditor independence.  These studies also show that people with 
greater knowledge about the auditing profession are less concerned about the potential 
threat of non-auditing services on auditor independence’. (p.1). 
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independence.
53
 Similarly, in the United States attitudinal research conducted on behalf 
of the Independence Standards Board (Earnscliffe Research & Communications, 2000) 
does suggest concerns among North American financial statement users as to the 
continuing evolution of auditing firms into multi-disciplinary professional services
54
 and 
the SEC heard a depth of evidence of user concern as it deliberated ahead of its 
November, 2000 rule changes (SEC, 2000). It is very probable that studies carried out in 
the present post-Enron
55
 financial reporting and auditing climate would witness a much 
higher degree of user concern than previously exhibited. 
 
9.4 Lack of Evidence of Adverse Economic Impact  
 
Evidence that high levels of provision of non-audit services to audit clients has direct 
economic effects is similarly sparse. Studies into the reaction to the SEC required 
disclosures between 1978 and 1982 showed little evidence of changes in the pattern of 
purchases of non-audit services (Scheiner and Kiger, 1982; Scheiner, 1984) or of any 
impact on shareholder auditor approval ratios (Glezen and Millar, 1985). Subsequently, 
Antle et al. (1997) found no evidence that the pricing of auditor liability insurance to the 
(then) Big Six firms was affected by the level of provision of non-audit services by the 
individual firms and concluded that ‘Because the insurers have such an obvious and 
direct monetary interest in such matters, this is evidence that the supply of non-audit 
services has not damaged auditor independence.’
56,57
 
 
Empirical work in this field has been restricted because of the lack of disclosure of data 
for audit and non-audit services in the United States. Those studies using publicly 
available data which have taken place outside the United States have focused primarily 
on the interaction between the pricing of audit and non-audit services. However 
subsequent to the introduction of the US disclosure requirements a study by Frankel et 
al. (2002) based on more than 4,000 proxy filings found a negative market reaction to 
proxy statements filed by firms reporting higher than expected non-audit service fees. 
The study also found there to be an inverse relationship between the level of non-audit 
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 Another UK study by Brand Finance (2000) found that 94% of analysts surveyed (who 
expressed an opinion) and 76% of company representatives surveyed (who expressed 
an opinion) considered that significant levels of non-audit service provision were likely to 
compromise independence. 
54
 It also illustrates how quickly perceptions can change a key finding of the study being that: 
‘Interviewees felt very confident and satisfied with the general standard of financial reporting in 
the US.’ 
55
 And post-Worldcom where disclosed non-audit fees of $12m were apparently three 
times the audit fee of $4m. 
56
 p.25.  
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 The SEC rejected this argument: ‘we do not believe as urged by at least one 
commentator, that liability insurance premiums are a barometer of the extent to which 
non-audit services pose a risk to audit quality’, on the grounds that a very wide range of 
other factors affected the setting of liability insurance premiums. (SEC, 2000). 
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fees and the extent of earnings management. Firms purchasing more non-audit services 
from their auditor were more likely to meet earnings benchmarks and to report large 
discretionary accruals. In the United Kingdom the evidence to date is more mixed. Gore 
et al. (2001) found there to be evidence that earnings management activity to avoid 
losses and earnings decreases was positively associated with the scale of provision of 
non-audit services for companies with non-Big Five auditors but not for companies with 
Big Five auditors. Earnings management to meet analysts’ forecasts was positively 
associated with the extent of non-audit service provision irrespective of whether the 
auditor was Big Five or not. 
 
9.5 Lack of Evidence of Association Between the Provision of Non-Audit Services 
and Audit Failure 
 
It is frequently argued that there is little if any direct empirical evidence linking the supply 
of non-audit services to audit clients with audit failure
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 and it was the lack of identification 
of such a link which in part influenced the Cohen Commission not to recommend 
prohibiting non-audit service provision to audit clients. Antle et al. (1997) suggest that 
independence concerns are raised in a very small number of legal actions against 
auditors with yet fewer specific reference to non-audit services in these actions. Others 
have suggested that the establishment of such a link in individual cases is likely to be 
problematic because the nature of conscious or unconscious influences on an auditor’s 
judgement are unlikely to be documented in a manner that provides incontrovertible 
evidence of an association.  
 
Put simply, an auditor is not going to make a file note which says that a particular 
accounting treatment is acceptable because the client is such a valuable source of non-
audit services fee income or that systems weaknesses should be ignored because the 
accounting firm advised on systems installation. As the US Public Oversight Board noted 
a year following the publication of the Cohen Report: ‘Specific evidence of loss of 
independence through MAS [management advisory services], a so-called smoking gun, 
is not likely to be available even if there is such a loss.’
59
 (POB, 1979). 
 
This issue was considered at length by the SEC which took the view that ‘the asserted 
absence of conclusive empirical evidence on this point is not particularly telling’,
60
 and 
that in any case that the role of the regulator was to act in a prophylactic manner and if 
non-audit service provision was considered to be a threat to auditor independence and 
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audit quality then action should be taken before that led to actual audit failure. On this 
latter issue it set out its position thus: 
‘The Commission’s obligations to protect investors requires it to act 
before there has been a serious erosion of confidence in our nation’s 
securities markets. Our position is quite different from that of the CEO of 
an accounting firm that we should wait to adopt restrictions on non-audit 
services until there has been ‘a train wreck or stock market crash’. Our 
mission is not to pick up the pieces of such a ‘train wreck’ but to prevent 
one’.
61
 
 
9.6 The Role of Professionalism 
 
The traditional professional view of auditor independence was that set forward by John 
Carey (a former AICPA Executive Director) in1946: 
 ‘Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to apply either 
generally or in its peculiar application to the certified public accountant. 
Essentially it is a state of mind. It is partly synonymous with honesty, 
integrity, courage, character. It means, in simplest terms, that the certified 
public accountant will tell the truth as he sees it and will permit no 
influence, financial or sentimental, to turn him from that course.’
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An interview based research study carried out on behalf of the AICPA (Burke, 1997) 
provided some support for the notion that the traditional professional values represented 
by this quotation are still important within accounting firms today. He stated: 
‘there appears to be a strong norm both within these firms and 
throughout the profession, for maintaining independence as a means of 
providing clients with the best possible audit service and, in the larger 
scheme, providing financial statement users with the most accurate 
information with which they can make decisions. It would seem then, that 
auditors who uphold the norms of objectivity and independence will be 
recognized, to a large extent, informally by their peers and their 
supervisors, and to a somewhat lesser extent, perhaps, by their 
profession, for their contribution to supporting what are the underpinnings 
of our free market economy.’
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Others are more sceptical and would argue that, as over the years the importance and 
influence of the professional accounting associations has diminished, whereas that of the 
multi-national accounting firms has increased, traditional professional attitudes and 
values have all but disappeared. Their place has been taken by an attitudinal set with a 
heavy emphasis on short term economic considerations. They would point to a culture 
and framework in the large firms of management by objectives focused primarily on 
continuous earnings growth.
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 The importance of the firms in imparting values and 
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professional attitudes in the United Kingdom at least can be seen in a study of large firm 
trainee accountants (Anderson-Gough et al., 1998) which concluded that their subjects’ 
notions of professionalism were largely negotiated by the organisation for which they 
worked.  
 
9.7 Reputation Effects and Economic Sanctions 
 
Professional considerations apart there are economic incentives acting to maintain 
auditor independence. Economic models suggest that firms will give up apparent short 
term gains from non-independent behaviour so as to build up their reputation over the 
longer term which will in turn bring future economic returns (see Watts and Zimmerman, 
1981). As the firms grow in size the penalties attached to the discovery of non-
independent behaviour increase because there is more reputational capital at risk 
(Wilson and Grimlund, 1990). Antle et al. (1997) note that partners’ financial capital in 
each of the (then) Big Six firms in the United States at the end of 1996 exceeded $3.5 
billion - all of which could be put at risk if a firm engaged in non-independent behaviour. 
They also highlight the importance of actual and potential litigation against accounting 
firms in providing powerful incentives for firms to avoid systemic independence violations. 
They conclude: 
 ‘Taking a holistic view, we have found that auditors have many 
incentives to protect their independence. Legal liability is significant, 
and any firm that would damage its independence risks an avalanche of 
litigation. Auditors have substantial investments in reputations, audit 
technology and methodology and directly in their financial stakes in 
accounting firms.’
65
 
 
In many ways the fate of Andersen post Enron illustrates very clearly the risks attendant 
to non-independent behaviour. It is likely that the collapse of Andersen will significantly 
influence the attitudes and actions of the remaining large firm partners irrespective of any 
further regulation that may be put in place. However, it is by no means clear that reliance 
upon economic forces alone is necessarily the most efficient mechanism for maintaining 
auditor independence. To a greater or lesser extent over the last twenty five years all the 
large firms have been drawn into accounting and auditing cause celebres. None of these 
pre Enron appeared to have any but the most marginal effect upon the standing and 
growth of the firms.  
 
Post Enron events also do not support the view that significant (and potentially 
catastrophic) future risks associated with current behaviour will necessarily act sufficiently 
as a deterrent to business practices which predominantly focus on present gains. As an 
example, KPMG, in 2005, narrowly avoided criminal indictment in the United States (and 
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thus sharing the fate of Andersen) over fraudulent conduct involved in the sale of illegal 
tax shelters over prior years, by paying a $456 million penalty and meeting a number of 
additional conditions imposed by the US Justice Department. The nature of the audit 
service is such that it can take a long time, if ever, before sub-standard auditing is 
exposed to the light of day and in such circumstances the short term pressures on 
accounting firms, and more particularly on individual partners and managers, may again 
result in an unacceptable level of non-independent behaviour.   
 
Research into actual judgement and decision making of accountants and auditors from a 
behavioural perspective (see Prentice, 2000a,b for summaries of this literature) appear to 
indicate that consideration of long-term incentives acting to maintain auditor 
independence can be trumped by an emphasis on short-term gains regardless of the 
negative impact such a focus can have on future costs.  This directly conflicts with 
traditional economic models which suggest that firms (and individuals) will give up 
apparent short-term gains from non-independent behaviour so as to increase returns 
over the future. 
 
 
9.8 Recruitment to the Accounting Profession 
 
An argument which has been advanced by professional bodies and accounting firms on 
both sides of the Atlantic is that if accounting firms were not in a position to provide non-
audit services then they would be unable to recruit sufficiently skilled professionals able 
to deal effectively with a complex business and auditing environment. A linked argument 
is that it is the exposure to business practices and culture which trainee and junior 
auditors derive from non-audit service work which enhances their ability to audit 
effectively. Although there is no doubt that these considerations are seen as important by 
the large firms in the abstract at least they are perhaps difficult to sustain. There is little 
evidence that accounting firms had difficulty in recruiting high calibre personnel twenty 
five years ago when non-audit services were relatively much less important than they are 
today.  
 
There is likewise little evidence that accounting firms operating in the United States had 
difficulty in recruiting high calibre personnel after the prohibition of providing a number of 
non-audit services to audit clients post the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  One would expect 
market forces to determine appropriate recruitment for the, admittedly more complex, 
audits of today irrespective of whether accounting firms offered non-audit services to their 
clients. Furthermore, if it is exposure to non-audit work in itself (rather than the firm 
specific knowledge gained thereby which is discussed above) which leads to audit 
personnel becoming better auditors, this could be obtained by assignments other than for 
audit clients. There is no doubt scope for a wider study of the manner in which the large 
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accountancy firms have acted as a commercial training ground for such a high proportion 
of graduates in the United Kingdom (and perhaps to a slightly lesser extent in the United 
States) and the implications thereof - but it is less clear that privileging a particular 
profession, or set of commercial entities, in the manner suggested makes rational 
economic sense. 
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10.0 Conclusions and Policy Perspectives 
 
10.1 Concluding remarks 
 
This initial review has sought, within the constraints imposed, to present a broad 
overview of current research and policy concerns in order to stimulate the discussion of 
the provision of non-audit services to audit clients. This report by no means represents a 
complete analysis of the vast academic and other literature and the policy discussion on 
the topic under review.  Within the scope of this review, little reflection was possible on 
the views of practitioners and stakeholders. 
 
Changes in audit methodologies reflect to an extent changes in technology, relative 
costs, the nature of financial reporting, and perceptions as to the auditor’s role, etc.  The 
major audit firms take the position, some more forcefully than others, that the accounting 
technology and internal control systems of their large clients are such that there is little 
purpose or value in conducting the type of detailed transactions or systems-based audit 
that used to take place.  In the meantime, audit reinvented and repositioned itself to fit 
more comfortably into an added value role within the overall assessment and 
management of risk for the benefit of the company and its stakeholders.  This in turn 
gave prominence to the provision of additional services over and above audit to the client 
– services initially proposed to enhance the quality and efficiency of audit by adding to 
the information available to the auditor. 
Unfortunately such an approach carries significant dangers in terms of enhanced threats 
to auditor independence, threats which may outweigh any perceived benefits from an 
integrated audit approach.  There is no doubt that the provision of extensive consulting 
services provided significant spillover benefits to Enron’s auditors.  Although not 
necessarily aware of every detail of Enron’s manipulations, it is incontestable that 
Andersen were in possession of detailed information, as to the financial engineering that 
was taking place.  Such information is likely to have been costly and time consuming to 
obtain if Andersen were not acting in a consulting capacity.  However, few would argue 
that this led to a superior quality audit – as auditors Andersen willingly accepted a whole 
range of accounting treatments at the limits of US GAAP which taken together turned the 
financial statements into a meaningless farrago and rendered the audit opinion thereon 
worthless.  It is true, with the benefit of hindsight, the quite extensive note disclosures – 
many of which appear to have been at the behest of Andersen, should have been 
accorded more attention by analysts and others, but they were not.  One is inevitably 
drawn to the conclusion that as an example of the business risk audit approach 
Andersen’s audit of Enron failed both in terms of contributing to the client’s overall risk 
management profile and in the more prosaic role of coming to an appropriate opinion on 
the financial statements offered to the capital markets and to other stakeholders.  From a 
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policy making perspective if the quality of external audit is thought to be important the 
question is whether the professionalism and/or economic self-interest of individual 
auditors and audit firms can be relied upon to deliver that quality within the context of the 
modern approach to audit. 
Some place their confidence in professional values to ensure that auditors will deliver that 
quality.  An interview-based research study within professional firms carried out on behalf 
of the AICPA (Burke, 1997) concluded, for example, that: 
‘There appears to be a strong norm both within the firms and throughout 
the profession, for maintaining independence as a means of providing 
clients with the best possible audit service and, in the large scheme, 
providing financial statement users with the most accurate information 
with which they can make decisions.  It would seem then, that auditors 
who uphold the norms of objectivity and independence will be 
recognized, to a large extent, informally by their peers and their 
supervisors, and to a somewhat lesser extent, perhaps, by their 
profession, for their contribution to supporting what are the 
underpinnings of our free market economy.’ (p.5) 
Others are more sceptical and argue that as over the years the importance and influence 
of the professional accounting associations has diminished, a trend that accelerated with 
the re-regulation of audit in the wake of the Enron scandal, traditional attitudes and 
values have all but disappeared.  Their place has been taken by an attitudinal set with a 
heavy emphasis on short-term economic considerations. They would point to a culture 
and framework in the large firms of management by objectives focused primarily on 
continuous earnings growth (Dirsmith et al., 1997; Brierley and Gwilliam, 2001).  The 
importance of the firms in imparting values and professional attitudes in the United 
Kingdom at least can be seen in a study of large firm trainee accountants (Anderson-
Gough, et al., 1998), which concluded that their subjects’ notions of professionalism were 
largely negotiated by the organization for which they worked. 
Professional considerations apart there are economic incentives acting to maintain 
auditor independence.  Economic models suggest that firms will surrender apparent 
short-term gains from non-independent behaviour so as to build upon their reputation 
over the longer term which in turn will bring greater future economic returns (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1981).  As the firms grow in size the penalties attached to the discovery of 
non-independent behaviour increase because there is more reputational capital at risk 
(Wilson and Grimlund, 1990).   
Antle et al. (1997) noted that partners’ financial capital in each of the (then) Big Six firms 
in the United States at the end of 1996 exceeded $3.5 billion – all of which could be put 
at risk if the firm engaged in non-independent behaviour.  They also highlighted the 
importance of actual and potential litigation against accounting firms in providing powerful 
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incentives for firms to avoid systemic independence violations.  Antle et al. (1997) 
concluded: 
‘Taking a holistic view, we have found that auditors have many 
incentives to protect their independence.  Legal liability is significant, 
and any firm that would damage its independence risks an avalanche 
of litigation.  Auditors have substantial investments in reputation, audit 
technology and methodology and directly in their financial stakes in 
accounting firms.’ (p. 31) 
It is unfortunate, however, that the assumption that people will behave in ways that 
maximise the mathematical construct of expected utility is at odds with a large body of 
evidence from psychology and behavioural research.
66
  Applications of the latter 
approach to the work of auditors and other agents in corporate governance demonstrate 
that individuals and firms can systematically behave in ways which run counter to their 
own best interests and to the rational model of traditional economics underlying much of 
existing regulations and legal decisions (Prentice, 2000a,b; Coffee, 2001, 2003; Marnet, 
2008). 
Auditors’ judgement has been found to be affected by heuristics and biases, which 
invariably influence their decision-making and impact on the objectivity and 
independence of the auditor (Prentice, 2000a,b; Bazerman et al. 2002a,b; Marnet, 2007).  
As noted in a review on the importance of scepticism to an auditor’s work, by the APB 
(2012), cognitive biases (whether conscious or sub-conscious) are likely to affect 
individual’s perceptions and assessments, and interfere with the attainment of objective 
judgement, particularly in the face of complex problems or incomplete information which 
require judgement under uncertainty.  Cognitive bias has the potential to introduce 
systematic errors to decision-making during audit (Bazerman et al. 2002a,b). A 
diminished degree of scepticism, and associated impacts on the quality of audit, is just 
one manifestation of the effect of bias on judgement induced by a greater stream of 
revenues from the joint provision of non-audit services. 
In many ways the fate of Andersen post Enron illustrates very closely the risks attendant 
to non-independent behaviour.  It is likely that the collapse of Andersen has influenced 
and will continue to influence the attitudes and actions of partners in the remaining large 
firms, irrespective of any further regulation that may be put in place.  However, it is by no 
means clear that reliance upon economic forces alone is the most efficient mechanism 
for maintaining auditor independence.  To a greater or lesser extent over the past 30 
years all the large firms have been drawn into accounting and auditing cause celebres. 
None of these pre-Enron appeared to have any but the most marginal effect upon the 
standing and growth of the firms, although Laventhol & Horwath, then the seventh 
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biggest US accounting firm was forced into bankruptcy in late 1990, as the result of 
settlement of litigation claims (Stiner, 2010).  The nature of the audit service is such that it 
can take a long time, if ever, before sub-standard auditing is exposed to the light of day 
and in such circumstances the short-term pressures on accounting firms, and more 
particularly on individual partners and managers, may again result in an unacceptable 
level of non-independent behaviour.  One clear policy implication is that if it is not thought 
worthwhile to grasp the nettle and severely restrict (as recommended by Canning and 
Gwilliam, 2002), or broadly prohibit the provision by auditors of non-audit services to their 
audit clients (as implemented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; and suggested by the 
European Commission in 2011), then this might point to the necessity of establishing a 
legal environment within which parties that have suffered as a result of inadequate 
auditing have a realistic chance of redress through the courts. 
Numerous studies have attempted to determine whether the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services affect auditor independence but, as noted earlier, findings to date 
have been mixed and inconclusive, although evidence suggesting perceived 
independence to be impaired from joint provision is fairly robust, and on balance the 
evidence suggesting negative effects on audit quality from joint provision appears to be 
more appealing.  Perhaps it is time to accept evidence from research on human 
judgement formation which suggests that joint provision inevitably impairs auditor 
independence, and that the only failsafe solution to avoiding potential conflicts of interest 
is the prohibition of all consultancy services to audit clients.  This would remove a major 
source of self-serving bias.    
 
But the issue perhaps lies deeper yet.  Rules and regulations can be tightened but the 
continuous emergence of financial scandals despite countless changes in regulations 
and legislation provides evidence on the resourcefulness of individuals in finding ways 
around restrictions placed upon them. Rather than continuously asking questions on 
which we arguably already have obvious answers to, a future research agenda might 
wish to explore the embedment of integrity in an auditor’s work, to ask what influences 
the behaviour of individuals? what factors will encourage honest behaviour? what factors 
will stimulate dishonest behaviour? how do factors related to upbringing, past 
experiences, peer pressures, societal norms, education and training affect the integrity of 
an individual? and how can integrity be enhanced? 
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10.2 Policy options 
 
The spectrum of possible policy options is a wide one including: continuation with the 
present arrangements; further disclosure of the nature and type of services provided; 
arrangements for compulsory tendering
67
; extending the range of proscribed services; 
complete prohibition of the provision of non-audit services to audit clients; or even 
complete prohibition of the provision of non-audit services by firms offering statutory audit 
services. 
 
If it is believed that the workings of the market will ensure that firms only deliver non-audit 
services to their audit clients to the point at which the marginal benefit to society of such 
provision is equal to the marginal cost in terms of the threat to independence then the 
case could be made for no further regulatory intervention. There has been significant 
market change post-Enron both in terms of accounting firms voluntarily withdrawing from 
the provision of certain types of non-audit services, for example internal audit, to their 
audit clients and in a greater reluctance by clients, responsive to the concerns of the 
capital markets, to purchase of non-audit services from their auditor. However, the 
current crisis of confidence in the profession at least does raise significant doubt if the 
position has indeed been optimal in recent years, and in the present political climate one 
would need a strong belief in market efficiency to advocate that no action should be 
taken. 
 
Extending the range and type of proscribed services in line with those of the SEC and 
considered by the European Commission is another option. It is however difficult to 
determine, within the framework of the arguments outlined above, which particular 
services carry the greatest threat to auditor independence. It is also likely that any 
attempt to categorise services in terms either of traditional association with audit, for 
example taxation services, or linked assurance services necessary to ensure compliance 
with statutory or other regulatory requirements will be fraught with difficulty. This difficulty 
is exasperated given that services are constantly evolving and being redefined 
(Jeppesen, 1998). 
 
Given the concerns as to the effect on independence, the underpinning argument for 
allowing audit firms to provide services other than audit to their clients in today’s 
commercial environment might indicate that to interfere in the workings of the market 
would impose economic costs and that these costs outweigh any possible costs 
attendant upon non-independent behaviour by auditors. However, the costs of 
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intervention are difficult to quantify and are indeed based on an intuitive perception that 
there must be economies of scope from the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services. In contrast, in North America at least, the perceived costs of non-independent 
audit behaviour are salient and resulted in prohibition of a wide range of NAS provision to 
audit clients (SOX, 2002), with increasing concerns about the impact of NAS on the 
quality of audit within the UK and Europe (See, for e.g., EC, COM(2011) 779)).  We also 
note that a combination of market trends and regulatory pressures have led to a 
considerable decline in joint provision. 
 
Despite the significant structural changes and the formal disposal of all or part of their 
consulting services by the very large firms in the previous decade, the renewed 
significant rise of the revenue importance of consulting services to accounting firms might 
imply a continued and increasing dependence on consulting through the backdoor, even 
where such services are not provided to audit clients. The continued ability for 
management to apply low visibility sanctions to an accounting firm is likely to remain an 
important factor given the tremendous rise in the importance of the provision of NAS, 
irrespective of whether these are provided to an audit client (in fact increasingly less so) 
or to a non-audit client (increasingly more so).  If an audit firm were perceived by client 
management to be overly critical of managerial assertions, particularly were it seen as a 
faithful and diligent watchdog for the shareholders rather than an accommodating and 
flexible friend of management, this could have obvious repercussions on the likelihood of 
retaining or gaining a lucrative service contract.  In reflection, observed market trends 
could be indicative of two problems:  First, the continued fee dependence of the audit firm 
on the audited company’s management, and secondly, an increasing susceptibility to 
economic coercion and low visibility sanctions due to the rising importance to accounting 
firms of the provision of consulting services, per se. 
 
Caution must be expressed in attributing how much of the downfall for example of Enron 
– which was essentially a poorly managed company – can be laid at the feet of auditors, 
although there is little doubt that their inaction delayed possible remedial intervention and 
had significant effects on the determination of the respective gains and losses of the 
various stakeholders.  A similar caution may be expressed on the role of audit with regard 
to the financial crisis of 2008/09 (although the House of Lords’ inquiry and associated 
report was rather critical, HOL 2010, 2011). Nevertheless, in circumstances where the 
costs of prohibiting the provision of non-audit services to audit clients are at best unclear 
and - if other providers of similar services are to be believed – there may indeed be no 
substantial costs, it is difficult to see that the appropriate regulatory response should not 
be to prohibit or stringently control the provision of non-audit services to audit clients. 
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There are likely to be practical issues to be considered in the implementation of such a 
policy in terms of determining what within the spectrum of audit and assurance services 
constitutes ‘audit’ and what constitutes ‘non-audit’. It may also be necessary to take 
action to ensure that the non-audit services provided to their audit clients by accounting 
firms today are not in future provided by entities with strong economic and commercial 
ties to the accounting firm auditor - a scenario that is, in the past at least, alleged to have 
been prevalent in certain of those countries which have prohibited the provision of non-
audit services to audit clients.
68
  These issues however are largely beyond the scope of 
this review the essential conclusion of which is that if the quality of audit per se is thought 
to be important to the workings of capital markets and society more generally then in 
circumstances where the benefits of the joint provision of non-audit services to client 
companies cannot be unequivocally demonstrated, the logical regulatory response is 
likely to be to prohibit the joint supply of such services to audit clients.  
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